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Summary
over the years, jürgen Habermas and Andrew Moravcsik have both written an 
impressive collection of academic works and public literature, dealing with one of the 
most contentious issues in the socio-political field, namely the process of European 
integration. despite their shared interest in subjects as the European constitution, 
the democratic deficit and a common European identity, little of their work has been 
examined from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. Therefore, this study 
confronts their main arguments through an intellectual dialogue. The aim is not to 
reconcile their views, it is rather an attempt to juxtapose their analyses, in order to make 
a critical assessment of the current challenges to the EU.
The two authors and their intellectual output about Europe are introduced and examined 
in separate chapters, focusing on the biographical background but also inserting 
contextual elements that elucidate underlying tendencies in their work. The crucial 
elements of their thinking are retained and extensively discussed in the final chapter that 
presents their arguments in the form of an indirect dialogue. Here, the aim of the study 
is to make a balanced evaluation of their work, using six overarching themes based on 
recurring topics. At the same time, Habermas and Moravcsik are also confronted with 
other authors, holding both similar and opposing views, in order to approach the issue 
of EU integration from a broader perspective.
The main conclusions of this study can be presented along the lines of three axes. First, 
Habermas and Moravcsik have opposed views with regard to the historical and future 
pathway of European integration. The German philosopher mainly emphasises globalisation 
as a transformative force, which eventually will lead to a post-national constellation, with 
the EU as a transnational democracy or a constituted world society. Moravcsik stresses the 
power and interests of member states in the integration process and foresees no further 
transformations in the near future, since the EU has reached a natural plateau.
Second, Habermas is worried by the executive role of heads of state and government 
and analyses this shift of power as a prelude to a post-democratic EU. Moravcsik is far 
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less worried about a potential democratic deficit, demonstrated with a comparison of 
national democracies. Third, while Habermas argues for the need of creating a common 
civic identity in Europe, Moravcsik sees little reason how this can be achieved. The 
essence of the debate resolves around the question whether or not a transnational 
(European) identity can be constructed in the foreseeable future.
The dialogue between Moravcsik and Habermas reflects on the observation that the EU 
can be approached and understood from a wide variety of perspectives – each of them 
holding merit and adding to the broader discussion of European integration. Habermas 
as well as Moravcsik have decisively shaped the debate and juxtaposing their views can 
only lead to new and fruitful insights in the workings of the EU.
Summary
The Natolin Best Masters’ Theses Series
Prof. Nanette Neuwahl 
director of studies 
College of Europe (EIS programme, Natolin Campus)
The  “Natolin Best Master’s Thesis” series showcases the best Masters’ Theses produced 
by the students of the Natolin campus of the College of Europe in any given year. 
The College of Europe (CoE), founded in 1949 at the instigation and with the support 
of leading European figures,  in particular,  Salvador de Madariaga, Winston Churchill, 
Paul-Henri Spaak and Alcide de Gasperi, is the world’s first university institute of 
postgraduate studies and training specialised in European affairs. The idea behind this 
particular institution was, to establish an institute where university graduates European 
countries could study and live together , and the objective was to enhance cross-border 
interaction and mutual understanding. The Natolin campus of the College of Europe 
in Natolin, Warsaw (Poland) was established in 1992 in response to the revolutions of 
1989 and in anticipation of the 2004 and 2007  enlargements of the European Union. 
Ever since, the College of Europe operates as ‘one College – two campuses’.
The European Interdisciplinary Studies (EIS) programme at the Natolin campus invites 
students to view the process of European integration beyond disciplinary boundaries. 
Students are awarded a ‘Master of Arts in European Interdisciplinary Studies’. This 
programme takes into account the idea that European integration goes beyond the limits 
of one academic discipline and is designed to respond to the increasing need for experts 
who have a more comprehensive understanding of the European integration process 
and European affairs. The EIS programme is open to graduates in Economics, Law or 
Political Science, but also to graduates of History, Communication Studies, Languages, 
Philosophy, or Philology who are interested in pursuing a career in European institutions 
or European affairs in general. This academic programme and its professional dimension 
prepare graduates to enter the international, European and national public sectors as well 
as nongovernmental and private sectors. For some of them, it also serves as a stepping 
stone towards doctoral studies. 
The European Single Market, governance and external relations are focal points of 
academic activity. Recognised for its academic excellence in European studies, the 
Natolin campus of the College of Europe has endeavoured to enhance its research 
activities, as well as to encourage those of its  students who are predisposed to do so, 
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to contemplate a career in academia. The European Parliament Bronislaw Geremek 
European Civilisation Chair and the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair in particular, 
encourage research on European History and Civilisation, respectively, the Eastern and 
Southern Neighbourhood. 
The EIS programme culminates in the writing of an important Master’s Thesis. At the 
College of Europe every student must, in order to get his or her degree, produce a 
Thesis within the framework of one of the courses followed during the academic year. 
The research must be original and linked to European policies and affairs, on a topic 
chosen by the student or proposed by the Professor supervising the Thesis. Very often, 
a student chooses a subject which is of importance to his or her subsequent career plan. 
Masters’ theses are written either in French or in English, the two official languages of 
the College of Europe, often not the native language of the students. 
A scientific committee selects the Best Masters’ Theses among more than 100 produced 
on the campus every year at the Natolin campus. By publishing them, we are proud to 
disseminate throughout the wider European studies academic community some of the 
most interesting research produced by our students. 
 
La série des meilleures thèses des Masters  
du campus de Natolin
Prof. Nanette Neuwahl 
directeur d’étude 
Collège d’Europe (Programme EIS, campus Natolin)
La série « Meilleure thèse de Master du campus de Natolin” met en valeur les meilleures 
thèses de master rédigées par les étudiants du campus de Natolin du Collège d’Europe 
pour une année donnée. 
Le Collège d’Europe (CoE), fondé en 1949 à l’instigation et avec le soutien de figures 
européennes de proue telles que Salvador de Madariaga, Winston Churchill, Paul-Henri 
Spaak et Alcide de Gasperi, est le premier institut universitaire d’études supérieures du 
monde spécialisé dans les affaires européennes. L’idée à l’origine de cette institution 
était de créer un institut dans lequel des diplômés universitaires issus de différents pays 
européens pourraient étudier et vivre ensemble afin de promouvoir la communication 
transfrontalière et la compréhension mutuelle. Le campus de Natolin du Collège d’Europe 
à Natolin, Varsovie (Pologne) a été fondé en 1992 à la suite des révolutions de 1989 et 
pour anticiper les différents élargissements de l’Union européenne prévus pour 2004 
et 2007. depuis lors, le Collège d’Europe fonctionne désormais selon la formule « un 
collège – deux campus ».
Le programme d’études européennes interdisciplinaires (EIS) du campus de Natolin 
invite les étudiants à analyser le processus de l’intégration européenne au-delà des 
frontières disciplinaires. Les étudiants obtiennent un “Master en études européennes 
interdisciplinaires ». Ce programme tient compte de l’idée que l’intégration européenne 
dépasse les limites d’une seule discipline académique et est conçu pour répondre aux 
besoins croissants d’experts qui conservent une compréhension globale du processus de 
l’intégration européenne et des affaires européennes. Le programme EIS est ouvert non 
seulement aux étudiant en économie, en droit ou en science politique, mais également 
aux diplômés en histoire, en communication, en langues, en philosophie ou en philologie 
désireux de poursuivre une carrière dans les institutions européennes ou les affaires 
européennes, en général. Ce programme académique et sa dimension professionnelle 
préparent les étudiants à intégrer les secteurs publics nationaux, européens et 
internationaux ainsi que les secteurs non-gouvernementaux et privés. Pour certains 
d’entre eux, ce programme constitue également une étape vers des études doctorales. 
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Le marché unique européen, la gouvernance et les relations extérieures sont des points 
majeurs de l’activité d’enseignement. Reconnu pour l’excellence de ses programmes en 
études européennes, le campus de Natolin du Collège d’Europe s’est engagé à améliorer 
ses activités de recherche, ainsi qu’à encourager ses étudiants les mieux prédisposés 
dans une carrière d’enseignement. La chaire de civilisation européenne du parlement 
européen Bronislaw Geremek et la chaire de politique de voisinage européen en particulier, 
encouragent la recherche sur l’histoire et la civilisation européenne, respectivement, et 
sur le voisinage avec l’Europe de l’est et du sud. 
Le programme EIS se termine par la rédaction d’une importante thèse de Master. Au 
Collège d’Europe, chaque étudiant doit, pour obtenir son diplôme, produire une thèse 
dans le cadre de l’un des cours qu’il a suivi au cours de son année d’enseignement. La 
recherché doit être originale et liée aux politiques et aux affaires européennes, sur un 
sujet choisi par l’étudiant, ou sur proposition du professeur chargé de la thèse. Souvent, 
l’étudiant choisit un sujet qui est important pour le déroulement ultérieur de sa carrière. 
Les thèses de master sont écrites en français et ou en anglais, les deux langues officielles 
du Collège d’Europe, bien souvent une langue différente de la langue maternelle de 
l’étudiant. 
Un comité scientifique sélectionne les meilleures thèses de master parmi les 100 dossiers 
produits sur le campus de Natolin chaque année. En les publiant, nous sommes fiers 
de disséminer dans toute la communauté enseignante européenne quelques-unes des 
recherches les plus intéressantes menées par nos étudiants.
 
Preface of the Master Thesis Supervisor
Prof. joão Carlos Espada 
Former chair holder of the EP/ Geremek  
European Civilisation Chair (2011-2013) 
College of Europe, Natolin Campus, Warsaw
This thesis is an importance contribution to a difficult and topical debate. Should the 
European Union be mainly perceived as a supranational undertaking, or should it be 
mainly based on the cooperation between nation-states? The author, Mr. Quincy Cloet, 
addresses the subject through a critical analysis of the works of two major contemporary 
scholars, Professors jürgen Habermas and Andrew Moravcsik. His analysis provides 
common ground for a critical conversation between the two scholars -- a conversation 
which has not occurred directly between them, but that Mr. Cloet develops with scholarly 
rigour and elegance. The author reaches his own conclusions on the debate and proposes 
his own guidelines for the continuation of a civil and civilised conversation between 
different views of the common European project. For those who are engaged, or want 
to engage, in this crucial conversation, this thesis is certainly a stimulus and a guide.
The general reader, as well as the scholar, will find in this work several helpful contributions. 
It provides a broad overview of the general work and intellectual evolution of the two 
major scholars, Habermas and Moravcsik, instead of simply aiming at a narrow approach 
to their more recent works on strictly European affairs. At the same time, though, the 
argument is focused on Europe and clearly identifies the main lines of argument in 
each author. These lines are then critically compared with arguments produced by other 
significant authors on the European endeavour. And they are finally organised in six 
themes, so that a rational and dispassionate comparison can be undertaken by any 
attentive reader.
At the end of his voyage of intellectual exploration, Mr. Cloet wonders whether the views 
of the two scholars can be reconciled. He then recalls that both Habermas and Moravcsik 
largely ask similar questions in areas of democracy, identity and state integration. This, 
Mr. Cloet maintains, provides room for common-ground. The latter, however, should be 
distinguished from uniformity -- "as contrasting views often offer fresh insights in old 
subjects", Mr. Cloet adds. This ability to perceive common-ground within a variety of 
views, and the corresponding ability not to ask for uniformity as a synonym of common-
ground, is certainly not the least virtue of Mr. Cloet's work.
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Common-ground within variety is certainly one of the greatest achievements of the Idea 
of a University, as it has evolved from Ancient Greece through the Roman Republic, 
Medieval Europe, the Renaissance and the Enlightenments to the present day. It has been 
argued that this union within variety has been possible mainly because Universities have 
learned to abide by stable and general rules, not by particular and changing purposes. 
Among those general and stable rules we have the rules of scholarly enquiry -- rules 
of openness, fairness, rigour, detachment. These rules have been strictly followed and 
applied by Mr. Cloet in this thesis. 
This rule-abiding spirit has allowed the author to develop a rich intellectual exploration 
and finally to propose a common-ground for a conversation between different, sometimes 
rival, views on the future of the Europe Union. one may perhaps be allowed to wish that 
this scholarly spirit of conversation between different views may continue to inspire our 
civic and political life in the European Union. As the late Professor Bronislaw Geremek 
always emphasised, this idea of civilised conversation between different, often rival, 
views has been a distinguishing and enduring feature of European Civilisation.
Preface of the Master Thesis Supervisor
Introduction
With an age disparity of almost thirty years, belonging to a different generation and growing 
up in separate environments, there appears to be no initial case of comparison between jürgen 
Habermas and Andrew Moravcsik. Two authors, who are separated not only by age, but also 
by geography and academic specialisation, create a great challenge to the purpose of this 
research study. Habermas is a continental European philosopher, an imperishable combatant 
for the sake of the public sphere and democracy, who devoted most of his academic work 
and political contributions to the betterment of modern society. In contrast, Moravcsik has 
rather limited himself to the scientific study of European integration, notwithstanding a few 
interactions with the wider audience through popular magazine contributions. However, 
both of them are the leading voices of different idiosyncratic schools of thought. Both of them 
are passionate about Europe, albeit wary of its ambitious dream of growing closer together.
despite their common zest for the European integration process, they have refrained 
from any genuine direct interaction. Their active stances in the same academic debates, 
often opposing each other’s views, have not culminated in a lively dialogue. Habermas 
has largely neglected the name of Moravcsik in his work, while Moravcsik makes few 
references to his German counterpart. In those rare references, there is little sign of 
reciprocal appreciation. The following citation written by Moravcsik illustrates this:
“Some democratic enthusiasts propose jump-starting EU democracy by 
incorporating hot-button issues like social policy and immigration, despite 
the lack of popular support for doing so. This is, in essence, Habermas’s 
vision. yet anyone except a philosopher can see that this is the sort of 
extreme cure that will kill the patient.”1
This remarkable absence of dialogue – at most it is limited to the margin of their work – is the 
immediate cause that resulted in the conduct of this research study. It is an attempt to bring 
the writings of two distinct authors together, through analysis and an intellectual exchange of 
1  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe without illusions – A category error’, Prospect Magazine, 23 july 2005. Available 
at: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/europewithoutillusions/ (consulted on: 22.04.2013).
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arguments – presented as a form of constructed dialogue. In other words, finding common 
ground in their work. yet, the prime motivation of the research is not necessarily to reconcile the 
arguments of Moravcsik and Habermas. In spite of their shared interest in Europe, its political 
systems and cultures – often resulting in research on identical subjects – it would be erroneous 
to perceive their notable differences through the spectacles of unity. Rather, individual views 
and arguments will be confronted and analysed, in order to attain their most important insights 
in the process of European integration. Moreover, pressing issues such as the healthiness of the 
democracy system in the EU and future trajectory of integration deserve a nuanced but vivid 
discussion, using the arguments of two intellectual heavy-weights. This study will attempt to 
create what Moravcsik and Habermas have never done in real terms.
Using their work, this study shall cast light on the versatile and multi-layered process 
of European integration. Where is Europe right now and where is it headed? Are we on 
the brink of achieving tighter political cooperation through economic assimilation and 
expansion? Tracing both the accomplishments and the weaknesses of the European Union, 
the wider implications of this establishment of a hybrid, post-national structure will be 
assessed. Questions shall be asked about the model of the European Union, the decision-
making process and the identification of citizens with a non-national construction. The work 
is divided into three parts, with an assessment of the life and work of jürgen Habermas, the 
background of Andrew Moravcsik and the dominant issues in his research, and culminating 
in an extensive dialogue based on overarching themes. The Habermas-chapter (1) traces the 
origins of the German philosopher’s enthusiasm for Europe – that only in the last decade 
took a visible position in his work. It consists of a chronologic overview of his career while 
reflecting on his most important contributions – that are connected to his latest work on 
the European Union. 
The Moravcsik-chapter (2) offers a brief look into the background story of the American 
political scientist, in order to understand his intentional choice for Europe. In addition, 
most of the chapter is devoted to the comprehension and analysis of his theoretical 
framework, i.e. liberal intergovernmentalism, and its compatibility with Moravcsik’s more 
recent writings on the European Union architecture. The final dialogue (3) combines the 
discussed issues of the first two chapters into a framework of six overarching themes. 
Issues ranging from the European integration trajectory to the possible democratic 
deficit and issues with citizen identification are extensively discussed, relying on the work 
of Habermas and Moravcsik and often juxtaposing their views. In addition, personal 
judgments and comments are added, to exemplify the underlying trends or indirect 
references in their thinking. The versatility of the dialogue-format allows me to present 
a case of comparison, while distilling the most effective insights of their work.
2
Introduction
Jürgen Habermas
The German philosopher and sociologist jürgen Habermas (1929-...) is plausibly one 
of the leading thinkers of the present day.2 during the career spanning for more than 
six decades, working mainly in Germany and for a brief period in the United States, the 
German scholar has influenced and inspired successive generations of academics and 
intellectuals, with his writings on critical social theory, communicative action and the 
public sphere. As a prominent public debater and the author of a multitude of political 
essays, Habermas has also become known to a wider audience as an intellectual who took 
public stances on such matters as military intervention and nuclear proliferation. only 
in recent years, Europe has played a central role. Never before had Habermas exhibited 
a real animation for the continuing integration process of the European nation-states 
and the changing contours of the European Union. yet, throughout the last decade the 
greater part of his monographs, articles and essays has been almost exclusively dedicated 
to the subject, whereby the European project became the amalgamation of his lifelong 
intellectual endeavours. So, what led to Habermas’ rather unexpected shift of focus?
His ‘turn toward Europe’ at the end of the millennium brought jürgen Habermas in 
chiefly uncharted territory. In 1999 he engaged the public by pointing to the lacklustre 
position of the nation-state in Europe and proclaiming the need to create a strong sense 
of (civic) solidarity that embraces all the citizens of the European Union.3 A few years 
later, in 2001, this idea was elaborated in a new essay, largely dealing with the question 
of a constitution of the European Union.4 These writings have not come up out of the 
blue, as there are two potential reasons to clarify why Habermas changed tack and chose 
to meddle with the intellectual debate of Europe’s integration process. 
2  Both Foreign Policy and Prospect, two influential magazines on international affairs and politics, have 
placed jürgen Habermas in their list of most influential thinkers.
3  jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization’, in: New Left Review, 
I/235, 1999, pp. 425-436.
4  original essay: jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’, in: New Left Review, No. 11, 2001, 
pp. 6-26. Reprinted as: Habermas, jürgen, ‘Why Europe needs a Constitution’, in: Rogowski, Ralf and 
Turner, Charles (eds.), The shape of the new Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
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on the one hand, it can be perceived as a response to the important events taking place 
during that time-frame (external dimension). The initially elitist project of European 
integration, decided by senior government officials, gradually came under more 
intense public scrutiny as its competences were amplifying into new areas of policy-
making.5 In the 1990s the European Union expanded its competences into the domain 
of economic and monetary cooperation, establishing new institutions and creating a set 
of monetary and economic policies, perceived as “a major step in a federalist direction”.6 
This Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) included a strong symbolic component, 
namely the introduction of a common currency, the euro. Likewise, the disappointment 
about the agreement reached on the Nice treaty (2001), raised the issue of commencing 
a debate on the future of the EU, to tackle important but unresolved matters. In 2001 the 
European Council issued a statement, known as the Laeken Declaration, which called 
for the establishment of a Convention for the future of Europe, and at the same time 
stimulated public and scholarly debate on the future shape of the Union. The authors 
of the declaration opened the floor to a discussion on the competences, instruments, 
transparency and efficiency of the EU, while stressing the possible “adoption of a 
constitutional text of the Union.”7 It is in this contextual setting that jürgen Habermas 
actively engaged himself in the intellectual debate surrounding the European integration 
project. 
on the other hand, the historical time-frame also falls short of elucidating Habermas’ 
choice of turning his attention to the state of European affairs. His views related the 
European Union are strongly rooted in the ideas promulgated in his earlier scholarly 
writings, as in many ways they share the same theoretical framework (internal 
dimension). Understanding Habermas’ position on Europe thus requires an insight 
in his discourses on the public sphere, critical thinking, communicative action and 
globalisation, among others. Ahead of exploring his recent work on Europe, I shall 
give a biographical introduction, intertwined with a selective thematic overview of the 
bibliography, emphasising the relevant monographs and their included theories as well 
as the circumstantial events that induced Habermas’ current position on the state of 
EU affairs.
5  on the elitist nature of the European project: “the contractual nature of European unification as a 
sequel and system of treaties puts elites in a pivotal role.” From: Heinrich Best, György Lengyel, and 
Luca Verzichelli, The Europe of Elites: A Study into the Europeanness of Europe’s Political and Economic 
Elites, oxford University Press, oxford, 2012, p.3.
6  Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (7th edition), Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2010, p. 57.
7  European Council, The Laeken Declaration, European Union, Brussels, 2001, p. 24.
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jürgen Habermas
Early years
jürgen Habermas was born just outside düsseldorf on the 18th of june 1929. At the time 
of birth he was diagnosed with a congenital disorder, a cleft palate that was the result of 
abnormal facial development during the early phases of pregnancy. Although he could 
communicate with his family, Habermas’ medical condition made it hard to interact 
with other people, especially at school where he was confronted with the difficulties of 
social interaction. Two corrective surgeries eventually solved his speaking deficiency 
but the early age experience had a lasting impact on jürgen Habermas. Stacy Clifford, a 
political scientist who published on the subject of disability and communication, believes 
that “these childhood experiences profoundly shaped Habermas’ view of human nature, 
interpersonal relationships, and his communicative theory.”8 It is a belief shared by jürgen 
Habermas himself, as he expressed in a 2008 essay that “failures of communication direct 
our attention to an otherwise unobtrusive intermediary world of symbols that cannot 
be grasped like physical objects.”9 It was his early day inability to speak – or in a broader 
sense his problems with communication – that confronted Habermas with “the power 
of language to forge a community”.10 This reading of his personal experiences would 
mould him for the rest of his life, as he became increasingly conscious of the importance 
of language and communication in the life of human beings.
His congenital disorder was not the sole experience that had an impact on Habermas. 
As a young child and teenager he witnessed the rise to power of the Nazi Party in 
his country, the territorial expansion of a militarised Reich, whose chain of aggressive 
actions eventually brought the second grand-scale World War to the European continent. 
Ernst Habermas, his father, was a convicted admirer of the Nazis and for some years 
jürgen Habermas was also a member of the Hitler youth – as most of the young boys at 
the time.11 At the age of 15, he was sent to the Western Front, an emotional event that 
would mainly lead to disillusion and revulsion. Especially the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the Nürnberg Trials uncovering in all detail the total annihilation of the 
jewish people, left him with a sense of shock and horror.12 Some years later, Habermas 
8  Stacy Clifford, ‘disabling democracy: How disability Reconfigures deliberative democratic Norms’, 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, 2009, p. 5.
9  jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, Polity, Cambridge, 2008, p. 15.
10  Lasse Thomassen, Habermas: A Guide for the Perplexed, Continuum, London, 2010, p. 5.
11  A. dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007, p. 108.
12  ‘jürgen Habermas’, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica online, London, 2013. Available at: https://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/250787/jurgen-Habermas (consulted on: 11.01.2013).
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struck a rather critical tone towards the behaviour of his compatriots after the turn of 
events in Nürnberg:
“When others, instead of being struck silent by the ghastliness, began 
to dispute the justice of the trial, procedural questions, and questions of 
jurisdiction, there was that first rupture, which still gapes. Certainly it is only 
because I was still sensitive and easily offended that I did not close myself 
to the fact of a collectively realized inhumanity in the same measure as the 
majority of my elders.”13
Nevertheless, the above statement also demonstrates the fragility of Habermas as a 
young teenager, grabbed by these exceptional happenings. The first years after the war 
were a sobering experience: the whole European continent was in disarray, cities were 
devastated and national economies destroyed, peoples were divided by decades of 
international hostilities. Europe was in need of re-building, including the creation of 
post-war solidarity which would bring different nationalities together. When Habermas 
in the later stage of his life would dedicate an important monograph to communicative 
action, stressing a consensual form of social coordination, one cannot but see this in the 
light of the conflictual events at the European stage in his early years.
Studies and Frankfurter Schule
jürgen Habermas concluded his secondary education shortly after the war and continued 
his studies at the universities of Bonn, Göttingen and Zürich. In 1954 he completed 
a Phd in philosophy at the University of Bonn with a dissertation on the German 
philosopher Friedrick von Schelling, as to the schism between the absolute and history 
in his thought. Habermas did not only concern himself with the nineteenth century 
philosophy but also studied the works of contemporary authors. He had a keen interest 
in Martin Heidegger’s existential philosophy, although his initial enthusiasm would 
eventually evolve into strong criticism. during the post-war period Heidegger had 
never publicly distanced himself from his affiliation with National Socialism. When 
Habermas called in 1953 for an explanation, he was met with “a shameful silence” by 
the former rector of Freiburg University.14 Heidegger’s inability to express regret brought 
Habermas to the inevitable conclusion that “German philosophical tradition had failed 
13  Pauline johnson, Habermas: Rescuing the Public Sphere, Routledge, London, 2006, p. 13-14.
14  jürgen Habermas, ‘Work and Weltanschauung: The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective’, 
in: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1989, p. 433.
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in its moment of reckoning”.15 Since then, he has shifted his attention to the practises of 
Anglo-Saxon philosophical thought, in a search for concepts that emphasise democratic 
principles and pragmatism – a fruitful shift with regard to the development of his ideas 
on reason, freedom and justice, among others.16
However, jürgen Habermas did not leave Germany to study and work overseas but rather 
moved to the University of Frankfurt, where he became the first assistant of Theodor 
Adorno at the Institute of Social Research. Before the war, a school of interdisciplinary 
critical theory had established itself at the institute in Frankfurt, comprising researchers 
with a common interest in the dialectical philosophy of Georg W.F. Hegel and Karl 
Marx, and the shared belief to radically transform society.17 The so-called Frankfurter 
Schule was an attempt to overcome the barriers between various disciplines – such as 
philosophy, psychoanalysis and social science – with the ulterior aim to “understand 
critically the various elements comprising modern society.”18 The Heglian-Marxist 
school was, among others, led by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, two German 
professors from jewish descent which fled to the US during the war period but returned 
to resume their activities at the university and to re-establish the institute in 1953. 
despite the interruption, Horkheimer, Adorno and the other scholars continued their 
work on critical theory, although they had become more pessimistic about the chances 
of transforming society.19 jürgen Habermas joined the Institute in 1956, as assistant 
to Adorno, mainly to participate in a research project about the political disposition 
of students. At the same time, he began his work on a habilitation thesis (the second 
but higher doctoral degree), by exploring the origins of the public sphere. Although 
Habermas established himself as a dominant and original thinker within the school in 
short time, it would quickly lead to a rift with the pre-war generation of philosophers.
At the heart of the conflict was Habermas’ gradual drifting away from the classic Marxist 
positions held by the members of the school. It was a change that resulted from his 
enthusiasm for the Anglo-Saxon style of thinking, stressing the philosophy of praxis and 
15  james Bohman and William Rehg, ‘jürgen Habermas’, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, 2011. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/ 
(consulted on 07.01.2013).
16  Ibid.
17  ‘Frankfurt School’, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica online, London, 2013. Available at:  http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/217277/Frankfurt-School (consulted on: 11.01.2013).; james G. 
Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction, oxford University Press, oxford, 2005, pp. 5-6.
18  ‘jürgen Habermas’, in: Encyclopedia of World Biography, Chicago, 2004. Available at: http://www.
encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3404702717.html (consulted on: 11.01.2013).
19  james G. Finlayson, Habermas, p. 6.
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democratic theory, ideas largely absent in the work of Marx. A 1985 interview in New 
Left Review illustrates the increasing uneasiness of Habermas, in that period, declaring 
he “lived with a sense of having grown into different, decisively broader horizons of 
experience, of having been freed from provincial narrowness and a naively idealistic 
world.”20 Thus, Habermas dissociated himself “from an overstrained concept of theory 
derived from Hegel”, a move disapproved by Adorno and Horkheimer.21 Eventually, he 
broke away from the school, after Horkheimer’s criticism on his habilitation thesis, by 
relocating to Marburg University in order to finish the dissertation under the supervision 
of the historian Wolfgang Abendroth.22 Ironically, it would not be a final break with 
the Frankfurt school: five years later Habermas returned to succeed Horkheimer – 
in the meantime retired – as a professor of philosophy and sociology. Right after the 
publication, Habermas’ habilitation, named The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, gained a lot of praise in the scientific community for its detailed study of the 
development of the bourgeois public sphere.23
His first significant book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, 1962) is a detailed account of how the eighteenth-
century salons decisively influenced the emergence of the public sphere, which in turn 
would be a strong weapon against the absolutist political order of that time. In the 
centuries before, there was no clear separation between public and private, as state 
and society were perceived as the same. However, during the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth century, the aged model of the feudal society underwent a structural 
transformation, which eventually brought a new political order in the nineteenth century. 
At the centre of this far-reaching societal change was the bourgeois salon, defined as an 
inspiring gathering of upper class elite, a sphere where they would come together as the 
public, to debate matters of politics, religion and society. Habermas’ sociological and 
historical work pointed to political, social, cultural and philosophical developments in 
a multi-disciplinary attempt to describe the success of the bourgeois society, the new 
political order of the nineteenth century, and a world marked by political liberalism, 
20  jürgen Habermas, ‘A Philosophico-Political Profile’, in: New Left Review, I/151, 1985, p. 76.
21  Ibid., p. 77.
22  There was some debate over the disagreement that eventually led to a break-up between Habermas 
and the Frankfurt School. Craig Calhoun (1992) asserted that both Adorno and Horkheimer rejected 
the dissertation. However, Rolf Wiggershaus (1996) claimed that “Adorno, who was proud of him, 
would have liked to accept the thesis” and it was mainly Horkheimer that made some unacceptable 
demands for revision of the habilitation thesis. The latter would explain why Adorno was enthusiastic 
about Habermas’ return to Frankfurt in 1964.
23  james Bohman and William Rehg, ‘jürgen Habermas’.
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free-market capitalist thinking and a minimal state. jürgen Habermas did not conclude 
his story with the nineteenth century, as he analysed more recent developments as the 
emergence of the mass society, the creation of the welfare state – and according to him 
the gradual decline of the public sphere. The latter implied a strong criticism to the post-
war political culture of the 1950s and 1960s in West-Germany.24
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere also generated an intellectual 
framework that Habermas would eventually develop into a theory of communicative 
action. The way the bourgeois salon was portrayed in his habilitation thesis revealed his 
personal interest in a communicative ideal. Habermas presented it in 1962 as the idea 
of an inclusive critical discussion, completely free of any social and economic pressures, 
with discussion partners on equal footing. His communicative ideal is a consensus-
seeking model, where a cooperative attempt is undertaken to reach an understanding 
in matters of common concern.25 According to Todd Gitlin, a professor of journalism 
and sociology, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was not only a key 
work that transformed the field of media studies “into a hard-headed discipline”, it also 
highlighted the belief that “reason is rooted in the ability to communicate clearly with 
one another.”26 Habermas would establish his future theory of communication solely 
on rational grounds.
As a multi-disciplinary work, jürgen Habermas’ habilitation thesis influenced research 
outside the fields of sociology and history. It is noteworthy to mention that, among 
others, European studies has benefited from Habermas’ proposed analytical framework. 
In recent years, there were some attempts to connect the notion of the public sphere to 
the status of European integration. Claes de Vreese summarised in 2007 the academic 
debate by examining whether or not the emergence of the European public sphere may 
“contribute to the public legitimacy of the EU polity and its policies”, as it was the case with 
national public spheres.27 In his article de Vreese pondered whether EU media, citizens 
or institutions were the main cause for the supposed absence of adequate cross-country 
interaction and debate. Similarly, Nancy Fraser discussed the transnationalisation of the 
24  Krista, Hegburg, ‘Habermas, jürgen’, in: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, detroit, 2008. 
Available at: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045300982.html (consulted on: 11.01.2013).; 
jürgen, Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991.
25  jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation, 1991.; james Bohman and William Rehg, ‘jürgen 
Habermas’.
26  Todd Gitlin, ‘jürgen Habermas’, Time, 26 April 2004. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,994032,00.html (consulted on: 15.01.2013).
27  Claes H. de Vreese, ‘The EU as a public sphere’, in: Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 2, 
No. 3, 2007, pp. 1, 14-16.
9
Studies and Frankfurter Schule
public sphere, which evidently has direct implications for the analysis of the European 
integration process and the impact on citizenship and identity.28 The indispensable 
link between the two topics, the public sphere and European integration, also caught 
Habermas’ attention, as he made references to the public sphere (and a shared political 
culture) in his work on Europe, an element which will be brought up in more detail 
further on.
After holding a position at the University of Heidelberg for two years, jürgen Habermas 
returned in 1964 to Frankfurt to succeed Max Horkheimer as professor of philosophy 
and sociology. The publication and subsequent success of The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere had changed the minds of the critical theorists at the Frankfurt 
School and it was notably Theodor Adorno who supported his return. According to 
Rolf Wiggershaus, a German publicist who completed his doctoral degree under the 
supervision of Habermas in Frankfurt, Adorno was “ultimately able to bestow the crown 
of legitimate succession on the person who he thought was the most deserving and 
capable critical theorist.”29 From then on, Habermas became the leading voice within 
the School and he could steer its research in a novel direction, albeit keeping true to 
the Institute’s tradition. during the 1960s he dedicated his main works to the status of 
critical theory and social science (which led to Knowledge and Human Interest in 1968), 
exploring ideas still rooted in the thought of Horkheimer and Adorno, while actively 
engaging himself with the German student movement.30
Max Planck and the Theory of Communicative Action
Between 1971 and 1983, jürgen Habermas took up the position as director of the Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of the Scientific-Technical World in Starnberg, a small city 
in the German state of Bavaria. Up until that point, when he changed career and chose to 
direct the institute in Starnberg, Habermas had only worked in an academic environment. 
The Max Planck Society, a non-governmental research organisation (though funded by 
the government) uniting more than 35 Institutes in Germany, represented a different 
branch of research, as it was mainly occupied with the funding of exact sciences, 
characterised by a high level of specialisation and long-term projects. Nevertheless, the 
28  Nancy Fraser, ‘Transnationalizing the Public Sphere. on the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public opinion 
in a Post-Westphalian World’, in: Transversal Multilingual Webjournal, No. 3, 2007. Available at: http://
eipcp.net/transversal/0605/fraser/en (consulted on: 17.01.2013).
29  Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 1996, p. 628.
30  Lasse Thomassen, Habermas, p. 8-9.
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Society supported research in all areas of scientific importance, including humanities 
and social sciences. during the 1970s, Habermas was increasingly worried about the 
transformations taking place in contemporary society, and how these immense processes 
were influenced by science and technology. Since the institute in Starnberg was dedicated 
to the study of the scientific-technical world, jürgen Habermas could focus there his 
complete attention on the question at hand. He gathered a team of scholars from various 
disciplines, ranging from anthropology to philosophy, with the ambition to understand 
the basic conditions of the contemporary society.31
The period at Max Planck is generally considered as the transitional phase in the career 
of Habermas. Between the books Knowledge and Human Interests and The Theory of 
Communicative Action Habermas kept elaborating on the relationship between social 
science and modern society, while rethinking the (Kantian) normative and philosophical 
basis for critique. Simultaneously, he produced new monographs on such topics as 
rationality and society. Nevertheless, the transitional phase was altogether marked by 
a ‘linguistic turn’, which had a theory of language and communicative action as its 
final outcome. The basis for his conception of communicative conception was closely 
related to Noam Chomsky’s idea of linguistic competence.32 Habermas’ linguistic turn 
is perhaps best illustrated by an excerpt from his inaugural speech in Frankfurt in 
1965, and incorporated in Knowledge and Human Interests, which signalled his decisive 
orientation to language:
“What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: 
language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited 
for us. our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal 
and unconstrained consensus”33
The short speech fragment from 1965 in large part sums up the basis of all of Habermas’ 
future work on language and communication: an unequivocal belief in rational 
communication and the eventual prevailing ideal of consensus over dissent. Habermas’ 
wider theoretical framework would only be expanded in The Theory of Communicative 
Action (Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 1981), a two-volume study on the 
concept of communicative rationality that combined elements of classical sociology 
with critical theory.
31  ‘Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science’, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica online, London, 
2013. Available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/370363/Max-Planck-Society-for-
the-Advancement-of-Science (consulted on: 18.01.2013).
32  james Bohman and William Rehg, ‘jürgen Habermas’.
33  jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Beacon, Boston, 1971, p. 314.
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Similar to the 1960s, Habermas was not just an influential voice within academic and 
intellectual circles, he also stirred the public debate by responding to large political issues 
of its time. In the late 1970s the German society was agitated by the suspension of civil 
liberties after the threats of terrorist acts committed by the Red Army Faction. Habermas 
saw this government action as a serious menace to the democratic institutions and he 
feared that the hunt on the violent left-wing RAF-members would have consequences 
for other leftist non-violent intellectuals.34 In these public actions, his personal view 
on human interaction, public debate (discourse) and cooperation predominated, 
as Habermas linked the various discussions to the necessity of reaching mutual 
understanding through rational means.
The Theory of Communicative Action gathered the myriad of subjects that Habermas 
was dealing with in those days. It was an extensive attempt to address all his intellectual 
issues with language, cooperative behaviour, philosophy, as well as the status of social 
sciences and the method of critical theory. on the whole, it reflected a methodological 
criticism of the large-scale macro-sociological and historical theories of the 19th century 
– with Marxism as the example of a broad but deterministic theory – and while the 
monograph dealt with grand societal processes, the analysis was not composed of a 
singular all-encompassing theory, but rather an amalgam of various practical concepts. 
james Bohman and William Rehg, two authors of the work on Habermas, define it as 
“a two-level social theory” that includes elements of rational communication on the 
one hand, and an abstraction of modern society and modernisation on the other hand. 
According to Bohman and Rehg, the latter is the key “to assess the gains and losses of 
modernisation and to overcome its one-sided version of rationalisation.”35
The title of the two-volume monograph suggests that it is essentially concerned about 
language as a fundamental form of human interaction. The aim is to reason how speech 
situations function and in what way they should be taken apart and understood – although 
he considers communication as more than mere speech.36 However, the two-volume 
work does also address other issues before placing language at the heart of the argument. 
Habermas initiates his research by returning to the tradition of critical theory, which 
stresses a practical and pluralistic mode of critical inquiry. In other words, Habermas 
believes that the participants in a discussion should be able to critically verify each other’s 
arguments, as it is an imperative part of the process. Subsequently, the critical enquiry 
34  Lasse Thomassen, Habermas, p. 10.
35  james Bohman and William Rehg, ‘jürgen Habermas’.
36  jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon, Boston, 1984, p. 101.
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of humans anticipates the necessity of a concept of rationality, which revolves around 
the question how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge. Humans 
articulate themselves through structures of communication, i.e. language, which means 
that speech cannot be separated from reason. 
By closely tying communication and rationality together, Habermas can conclude 
that agreements based on reason are possible and desirable at the same time: mutual 
understanding can always be found through rational discussion. As such, Habermas 
exhibits the ideal type of ‘communicative action’: it portrays situations in a modern 
society where humans raise, accept, and reject various claims for truth, on the basis of 
rational arguments. In The Theory of Communicative Action, language is placed entirely at 
the core of the argument, assumed to be a rational medium to coordinate actions, as well 
as a practical approach to reach understanding. Thus, the ideal type combines rational 
behaviour with cooperative behaviour, and it is opposed to what Habermas defines as 
‘strategic action’. The latter is an approach that is solely based on the pursuit of individual 
interests, where mutual understanding and cooperative behaviour is unwanted.37
For communicative action to thrive, it is necessary that human interaction is uncoerced 
and takes place within rational boundaries. It should in no way be limited by any 
unnatural external force. However, Habermas designed “communicative action” as an 
ideal type for a community, which means it can only be applied as a tool for analysis 
– a model for free and open public discussion and political participation within a 
liberal-democratic society – rather than being used as a realistic rule for daily human 
interaction. Habermas makes a remarkable connection with liberal democracy, which 
particularly highlights the influence of the Anglo-Saxon philosophical thought on his 
work – especially the tradition of democratic thinking and universal inclusion. In his 
words: “nothing better prevents others from perspectivally distorting one’s own interests 
than actual participation.”38 Is Habermas justifying the need for deliberative, liberal-
democratic political institutions by constructing a model that solely relies on open, 
inclusive and rational discussion?  Although that is not entirely clear in The Theory of 
Communicative Action, he does warn that liberal democracy in itself is not a sufficient 
guarantee for a communicative rationality. The risk of strategic rationality is always 
lurking around the corner, according to Habermas, as economic and bureaucratic forces 
push towards a more individualistic and a less cooperative way of thinking. Strong 
37  james Bohman and William Rehg, ‘jürgen Habermas’.; Stacy Clifford, ‘disabling democracy’, p. 5-6.
38  jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. Vol I., p. 186.
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influences of political power and economic efficiency can sway humans to change their 
behaviour.39
Habermas pointed to the crux of the matter, by referring to the political and societal 
implications of his theory of communication. If an open and democratic society is 
reigned by an economic pensée unique, it shall disrupt the public sphere (“disintegration”) 
and restrain people from freely discussing ideas (“formation of opinion”) and coming 
to a mutual understanding.40 In an indirect fashion, Habermas heavily criticised 
economic liberalisation, taking place in the 1970s and 1980s, and how modern society 
was increasingly subjected to a variety of economic institutions and structures, better 
known as markets. Here, the German philosopher was already bringing diverse pieces 
of his thinking together, which around the turn of the century would inspire him to 
write about the risk of (economic) globalisation, and how Europe and the international 
community can adequately respond to such a tremendous challenge.
In the margin The Theory of Communicative Action also dealt with the concept of 
discourse, which is a more reflective form of communicative action, and presented by 
Habermas as the process of argumentation and dialogue. james Bohman and William 
Rehg defined it as the ability “to recognise the intersubjective validity of different claims 
on which social cooperation depends.”41  In other words, humans implicitly test each 
other’s claims for sincerity and authenticity. Thus, discourse serves as a broader basis for 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action. As the two theories were woven together, 
both came under scrutiny after the publication of The Theory of Communicative Action. 
Critics of various tendencies, ranging from Marxist to neo-conservative, considered 
Habermas’ idealised, rational model of communication as an empty and formal 
shell, since it did not take the various distortions in democratic institutions and the 
importance of rhetorics and “compositionality of language”42 into account. While The 
Theory of Communicative Action tried to define communication as a broader concept, it 
confined itself in large part to the analysis of speech and language.43 Also, the (rational) 
39  jurgen Habermas, ‘A Philosophical-Political Profile’, pp. 101-102.
40  Ibid., p. 97.
41  james Bohman and William Rehg, ‘jürgen Habermas’.
42  Compositionality is a concept in the philosophy of language and states that a complex expressing has 
meaning because it is shaped by the structure and meaning of its separate components. Thus, language 
can only be considered language when it contains meaningful expressions, constructed from smaller 
and indicative components. Zoltán Gendler Szabó, ‘Compositionality’, in: ZALTA, Edward N. (ed.), 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford, 2011.
43  Roger Bolton, ‘Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action and the Theory of Social Capital’, Meeting 
of Association of American Geographers, denver, 2005, p. 11.
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assumption that all humans have the required linguistic competences at their disposal 
was considered as a problematic element of the theory. In the following years, Habermas 
would refute most of those criticisms while also expanding his theory to the fields of 
law, democracy and ethics.44
Rupture and Continuity
jürgen Habermas spent the late stage of his career again at Frankfurt, after his twelve 
year period as director of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, until he retired in 
1994. From that time forward, he dedicated himself to giving lectures around the 
world – mainly in the United States – while inquiring into the global and structural 
transformations taking place after the end of the Cold War. despite his seniority and 
eventual retirement, Habermas entered a period of prolific writing, as he published 
several influential essays deconstructing pressing issues as the changing international 
political system, the evaporating nation-state and role of democracy in a global economic 
context. Evidently, these subjects were in large part inspired by the events at the end of 
1980s and the profound shake-up of the political world order. Both elements of rupture 
and continuation were characteristic for this period. Between the years 1989 and 1991, 
the Cold War came to an end – after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the tumbling down 
of the Iron Curtain – and the Soviet Union bloc had dissolved. These were two profound 
moments of rupture. The breach in the Berlin wall, separating the former German 
capital, provoked an unsustainable migration flow of East Germans to the West. After 
Gorbachev dropped his initial objections, the distinct possibility of a reunited Germany 
eventually became reality.45
For the (West-)German philosopher Habermas, this sudden coalescence of the two 
territorial regions marked an important crossroads in the German history. At the 
same time, he was one of the first intellectuals to voice criticism of the “rush towards 
(re)unification”, as it could have unforeseen consequences, such as a “regressive re-
traditionalising tendency” and the danger of creating a new “national identity” – instead of 
a “constitutional identity”.46 His position was widely debated and provoked reactions from 
44  james Bohman and William Rehg, ‘jürgen Habermas’; Stacy Clifford, ‘disabling democracy’., p. 6.
45  ‘Germany’, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica online, London, 2013. Available at: http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/231186/Germany/58219/The-reunification-of-Germany (consulted on: 
25.01.2013).
46  Howard Williams, Catherine Bischop and Colin Wight, ‘German (Re)Unification: Habermas and his 
critics’, in: German Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1996, p. 214, 234-235.
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both politicians and intellectuals from the right-wing spectrum. However, it encouraged 
an intense discussion on the future of the new Germany society, which ultimately was 
completely consistent with Habermas’ view on discourse and communicative action:
“The philosopher who has preached the concept of ‘communication’ now 
practices this, arguing, debating, discussing, defending, explaining and 
fighting for discourse, against those narrators, historians, politicians and 
other figures who discourage it.”47
While the end of the Cold War and the victory of the United States over the Soviet 
Union may have been sudden schisms with calamitous effects, both widely observed by 
people and reported in the media, other and rather structural – perhaps less perceptible 
– transformations were along the way of adjusting the shape of the world. Two of these 
elements shall be highlighted here.
The first movement to be considered as an element of continuity, is known and can 
be defined as globalization.48 It is a widely-used concept even applied by Habermas to 
describe developments that have put the “entire [historical] constellation into question.” 
By that, he refers to the former constellation and perspective of the all-embracing nation-
state, the fact that “state, society, and economy are, as it were, co-extensive within the 
same national boundaries” – a position that shall be analysed in more detail further on.49 
Both in the academic world and public life, many things have been said and written about 
globalization, and there is a huge variety of meanings given to the concept. Manfred 
Steger, a professor of Global Studies, explains that globalization has been used “to describe 
a process, a condition, a system, a force, and an age.” It is a conceptual chameleon that 
covers various societal spheres next to a set of social processes, which shifts “our present 
social condition into one of globality.”50 despite the difficulty to determine its cause and 
driving force, there is a growing consensus that the main characteristic of globalization 
is the movement towards greater interdependence (especially of national economies) 
and closer integration. This includes, among others, elevated levels of international 
47  ‘der Ulrich der deutschen: “Staatsbürgernation oder ethnische Schicksalsgemeinschaft” - jürgen 
Habermas über “die nachholende Revolution”’, Die Zeit, 18 May 1990. Available at: http://www.zeit.
de/1990/21/der-ulrich-der-deutschen (consulted on: 14.02.2013). (Translation from: Howard Williams, 
Catherine Bischop and Colin Wight, Ibid., p. 236.)
48  Note the choice here to use the more common American English alternative (globalization), instead of 
the British spelling (globalisation); this results from the fact that the majority of the scientific literature 
on the subject utilises the American spelling.
49  jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 60.
50  Manfred Steger, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction, oxford University Press, oxford, 2003, pp. 
8-9.
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trade, increasing speed of communication and major advancements in technology and 
information systems.51
Globalization is far from a new phenomenon. The concept has been popularised in 
academic literature and public opinion since the 1980s and 1990s52, although the 
underlying process and defining the characteristics of globalization can be traced back 
further in time. In general, some scholars limit the process to the most recent decades 
– and the rise of the post-industrial society after the Second World War – while others 
believe its roots lay hundreds and even thousands of years back in time.53 No doubt, there 
were some eras in the history of mankind where a heightened level of interconnectedness 
took place, which could be understood as early phases of globalization. From the spread 
of hunters and gatherers over the five world continents twelve thousand years ago, 
and later during the Classical Age with the trade links – eventually known as the Silk 
Road – between the Roman, Persian and Chinese empire, till the gradual emergence 
of capitalism in the modern period; all these epochs in time were characterised by an 
acceleration of global forces. 
It follows that globalization should not be understood as a plain linear process of ever 
closer independence: epochs of intense global ties have alternated with moments of 
reduced interdependence and in-ward looking behaviour. john Maynard Keynes 
described in his work The Economic Consequences of the Peace of 1920 the common 
middle-class life before 1914, when the “inhabitant of London could order by telephone, 
sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity 
as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep.”54 The 
British economist, generating numerous examples of the benefits of a global economy, 
contrasted this situation of peace at the start of the twentieth century with the sudden 
backlash of globalization that erupted with the outbreak of the First World War. Manfred 
Steger shares the view propagated by Keynes, when he points out that we should avoid 
understanding globalization in terms of inevitability and irreversibility.55 
51  Ibid.
52  The nGram Viewer of Google, which uses raw data from more than twelve million books in its catalogue, 
confirms that the concept “globalization” gained ground in the last quarter of the 20th century. Available 
at: http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=globalization&year_start=1900&year_end=200
8&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=
53  Manfred Steger, Globalization, pp. 20-36.
54  john Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Project Gutenberg, Salt Lake City, 
2005, p.  8.
55  Manfred Steger, Globalization, p. 19.
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To return to the original point: as globalization is widely understood as a process, it 
includes an element of continuity – without falling into the trap of a linear process. An 
increased openness in terms of communication and exchange was taking place, largely 
independent of the appearing fissures during the events of 1989-1991. For example, 
the Cold War had not prevented people and firms from establishing international 
connections and integrating elements of production, research and innovation – although 
the process was divided along the ideological lines of the two superpowers. In fact, 
it was the growing economic globalization, including technological development and 
productivity, which created a power disparity that would finally amplify the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union.56
The second element of continuity rather deals with a regional process, namely the 
European nation-states adapting to a changing environment by continuing their process 
of integration. A part of Europe proceeded with a dual process of working closely 
together in a number of areas on the one hand, and shifting a part of state sovereignty 
to a supranational level on other. despite world-changing events in the last decades, 
the actions towards closer integration have not halted. With each new challenge the 
European Union has tried to find an adequate solution. In that regard, the European 
integration process cannot be considered independently of what has taken place on 
a larger scale. As a matter of fact, there are two striking examples that illustrate this 
relationship between the regional (European) and the world level. 
Economic and monetary integration, from the first draft ideas in the 1970s until its 
realisation in the 1990s, has been a response to ever stronger world-wide economic 
forces. From the start, it was an attempt to stabilise the volatile international exchange 
rate system, yet it eventually became a defence mechanism against the globalization 
of production, markets, industries, corporation, technology, and innovation. Another 
example is strongly connected with the events after the Cold War. The break-up of a 
bipolar world, the dwindling transatlantic relationship, made Europe more aware of its 
autonomous role in terms of foreign policy, development, migration and promoting 
civil norms. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992, including two institutional pillars devoted 
56  While there was increasing globalization, especially in terms of global production Stephen Brooks and 
William Wohlforth argue that it “took sides in the Cold War.” Because the Soviet Union and its allies 
were largely isolated from this increased (economic) interconnectedness, the superpower was unable 
to strengthen its innovative capacity, and consequently suffered from severe economic handicaps. “ It 
is easy to see how isolation from the globalization of production increased the difficulty of keeping up 
with the West in terms of general economic and technological productivity.” From: Stephen G. Brooks 
and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War’, in: International 
Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000, pp. 35-36.
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to a common foreign and security policy, and cooperation in terms of justice and home 
affairs, demonstrate that a new geopolitical map forced the EU to change its focus.
Cosmopolitanism and European prospects
jürgen Habermas’ framework of thinking was profoundly shaped by the elements 
of rupture and continuity that simultaneously took place in the last decades of the 
twentieth century. To a large extent, his recent writings reflect a profound worry about 
the challenges posed by these sudden events or intensifying tendencies. As I have 
touched upon the periodical context, now it is essential to examine how Habermas 
incorporates them into his existing world conceptions, as well as his theories constructed 
in the preceding decades. In that regard, two major trends in Habermas’ writing can 
be distinguished. on the one hand, Habermas emphasises the so-called post-national 
constellation and the potential emergence of a global political order – implying a sort 
of cosmopolitan thinking. Examples of Habermas analysis of these phenomena can be 
retrieved in the essay-collection The Postnational Constellation (2001), and the book 
chapter The European nation-state: its achievements and its limits. On the past and future 
of sovereignty and citizenship (from the publication Mapping the Nation, 2000). on the 
other hand, he discusses the European Union as a type of transnational political order 
– a step in the direction of a world order – reflecting an active and exertive response to 
global economic forces. In this case, the main sources are the essay Why Europe Needs 
a Constitution (2001) and the more recent book, The Crisis of the European Union: A 
Response (2012). 
Although both trends address different questions, there is a strong overlap between 
them, and Habermas frequently tries to deal with both the post-national constellation 
and the European experiment in his analysis.57 Since all these questions originate 
from one core observation – namely  how contemporary (post-modern) problems to 
society are imposed on our world, at different levels, and what is the best approach 
to respond to them – Habermas can apply the same type of reasoning. As mentioned 
before, he associates these issues to a large extent with the term globalization. Also, when 
he addresses the functioning of democracy and the role of a constitution, or rather a 
constitutional identity, it touches upon the question of the post-national constellation 
as well as the European integration project.
57  jurgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization’ (1999) is such an 
example, although most of the writings mentioned in this part reconcile to a certain extent the two 
trends.
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The Postnational Constellation (die postnationale Konstellation), originally published 
in German in 1998 but translated and printed in English in 2001, gives a most detailed 
account of the first trend, defined as adjustment toward an international political system 
– or a global political order. Habermas takes the first step by providing his view on 
modern society, i.e. a system based on a democratic community of “self-legislation” and 
“self-direction”.58 Up until now, this democratic society has only been realised effectively 
in the context of nation-states, which Habermas refers to as a historical or national 
constellation. Although he elaborates on the success of the nation-state – from its origins 
as a strictly administrative state until the development of a legal and social state – in 
the way it has handled problems and challenges to society, he stresses that in recent 
time the nation-state has been called into question by forces known as globalization. 
“The increasing scope and intensity of commercial, communicative, and exchange 
relations beyond national borders”, or in other words a global economy different from 
the traditional forms of an international economy, is endangering the nation-state as an 
institution.59 The so-called “locational competition”, which stands for increased labour 
productivity, rationalisations, reduction of labour forces and moveable business, has 
created a situation where markets dominate politics and the nation-state has lost its 
traditional capacity to intervene. National politics is no longer adequately equipped 
to address issues with regional, international or even global ramifications.60 Habermas 
thinks that any reaction to globalization on the basis of a national perspective, either “a 
hardening of national identities” or a “multiplicity” of hybrid cultures, will be insufficient 
to respond to the challenge ahead.61 In another article, he adds that by just accepting 
globalization and its “neoliberal orthodoxy”, the world would see “a drastic increase in 
social inequalities and fragmentation” and a drain on democracy.62
Habermas emphasises the necessity of a cosmopolitan “democratic order [that] does 
not inherently need to be mentally rooted in “the nation” as a pre-political community 
of shared destiny” as a potential way out for citizens and their societies.63 Governance 
beyond the nation-state is considered to be the remedy, since protectionism on a 
national level (a defensive position) will not help the nation-state to regain its strength. 
He foresees the establishment of a global political order, relying on a similar type of 
58  jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, p. 60.
59  Ibid., p. 66-67.
60  jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation., p. 67-70.
61  Ibid., p. 72-76.
62  jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’, p. 51.
63  jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, p. 76.
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democratic self-steering as it is present on a national level. However, the key for such 
a democratic order to succeed lies in the political participation of its (world) citizens. 
Every society requires a sort of mechanism that maintains the integrity of a differentiated 
society and avoids political fragmentation. This would give “political closure” to the 
“globally networked, highly interdependent world society.”64 Habermas believes that 
the mechanism can be found in the combination of active citizenship and political 
participation, reflecting the underlying belief in a communicative ideal:
“It is the deliberative opinion- and will-formation of citizens, grounded in 
the principles of popular sovereignty that forms the ultimate medium for a 
form of abstract, legally constructed solidarity that reproduces itself through 
political participation.”65
The second trend, the realisation of the European project, is inherently interconnected 
with the first trend as Habermas sees “the exemplary case of the European Union” 
as a potential realisation of “democratic politics beyond the nation-state”.66 Habermas 
verified this connection already in the Postnational Constellation, but it was only when 
the question of the creation of a Constitutional Treaty for the EU led to a prominent 
debate in the media, that the subject also became dominant in his cosmopolitan thinking. 
For Habermas, the post-national constellation could materialise in the discussion and 
ratification of a constitution, which in turn would define the contours of the European 
project. The essay Why Europe Needs a Constitution from 2001 gives the core argument 
of creating a constitutional treaty, using nontechnical terminology. The book The Crisis 
of the European Union: A Response (2012, originally published in German in 2011: Zur 
Verfassung Europas) provides an updated account of this idea, as well as an extended 
argument built on a more conceptual framework. At the same time, the recent publication 
exposes the flaws in the present European institutional architecture, established after 
the Lisbon Treaty. Both accounts are used here as a guide to distil Habermas’ take on 
the politics of the European Union.
“Why should we pursue the project of an ‘ever-closer Union’ any further at all?” is a 
key question that is brought up in the 2001 essay Why Europe Needs a Constitution.67 It 
refers to the debate on whether the EU should eventually become a real federation of 
nation-states, at the time a move met by sceptical responses all over Europe’s member 
64  Ibid., p. 85.
65  Ibid., p. 76
66  Ibid., p. 88.
67  jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs A Constitution’, p. 6.
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states. Habermas sees a constitution as a way to settle on various – political, social 
and economic – goals. While economic integration has advanced over the decades, a 
process completed with the single market and the single currency, political integration 
(especially the establishment of a legitimate process of decision-making), has lagged 
behind. Therefore, Habermas believes that Europe should refrain from decaying “into a 
mere market, sodden by globalization”.68 His discourse on the European Union entirely 
relies on the earlier work about global economic forces – rapid structural changes that 
bring social costs and widen the inequality gap. Habermas asserts that a re-regularisation 
is needed to counterbalance global forces, especially within the framework of the 
European Union, the most promising platform in terms of joint action. A European 
constitution would help to address the lingering democratic deficit of the EU, breaking 
up the “opacity of [the] decision-making process”, while pursuing a European state-
building “which does not reproduce the template of the nation-state”.69
The second question is raised, when Habermas portrays the position of Euro-sceptics: 
can there be a European project when there is not yet a European people? It is here that 
Habermas introduces the “voluntaristic character of a civic nation”, which reflects a 
collective identity based on the democratic process – in contrast to an “ethnic” conception 
of the nation: “democratic citizenship establishes an abstract, legally mediated solidarity 
between strangers.”70 According to Habermas, a constitution would have the catalytic 
effect of stimulating a Europe-wide debate, taking place through transnational ties of 
communication. In other words, a constitutional debate along the lines of his model of 
communicative action, that holds the promise of creating a European public sphere. 
National media with multinational audiences already exist, as a type of transnational 
communication, although there should be an increased and consistent effort by national 
media to cover important issues and opinions from other countries. It is only through 
“multiple, horizontal flows of communication” that a public sphere can be realised.71 For 
Habermas, such a sphere must be embedded in a shared political culture, which relies 
on common values and the memory of European history.
The essay is concluded by Habermas’ design of a framework of a constitution, 
envisioning its main features and principles. It is an attempt to find “the combination 
68  Ibid., p. 9.
69  Ibid., pp. 14-15.
70  In other contexts, Habermas has used the term “constitutional patriotism”to describe the phenomenon 
where individuals become citizens (with a shared identity) on an abstract and constitutional basis.; 
jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs A Constitution’, pp. 15-16.
71  jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs A Constitution’, p. 19.
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of a Europe of nation-states with a Europe of citizens”, or to balance the sharing of 
sovereignty between the federal and the national level.72 In brief, the Parliament would be 
strengthened (to resemble the American Congress), while a Chamber of Nations could 
act as a sort of Senate. The Commission should always remain less powerful – thus not 
acquiring all executive powers – whereas a European Court has the powers to interpret 
the constitution. For Habermas, the constitution could settle the difficulties over the 
distribution of competences, and overcome the problem of legitimacy.73
The Crisis of the European Union: A Response was published approximately ten years 
after the essay on the European constitution and brought a wider view on the process of 
unification. Written at a time when a severe financial, economic and social crisis raged 
through Europe, it was immediately perceived by commentators as a critical response 
to the actions taken by European leaders in combating the societal challenges, by 
dealing with the structural deficiencies of the Union.74 In the work Habermas castigates 
the European political class for what he believes is an attempt to establish a sort of 
“executive federalism” in times of crisis; a system of governance that intervenes in the 
core domains of the national parliaments and undermines the democratic “exercise of 
political authority”.75 According to him, the European Council does not dispose of the 
necessary democratic legitimacy to dictate member states with its closed-door legal 
decisions. Also, the newly established policy of supranational budgetary control and 
discipline, without any democratic accountability, defeats the object of the creating a 
genuinely legitimate Union.76
Habermas is of the opinion that the EU is moving away from the spirit of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which could have been a step towards a constitutional model (with a clear 
blueprint of competences and sovereignty and an extended basis for legitimation). The 
realisation of this European constitutional project holds the prospect of an eventual 
72  Ibid., p. 22.
73  Ibid., pp. 22-24.
74  Georg diez, ‘Habermas, the Last European: A Philosopher’s Mission to Save the EU’, Der Spiegel, 21 
November 2011. Available at (translated from German): http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/
habermas-the-last-european-a-philosopher-s-mission-to-save-the-eu-a-799237.html (consulted on: 
06.10.2012).; Valentina Pop, ‘Habermas’ solution to the euro-crisis’, euobserver.com, 8 june 2012. 
Available at: http://euobserver.com/reviews/116505 (consulted on: 22.02.2013).
75  jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, Polity, Cambridge, 2012, p. viii.; 
definition of executive federalism: “the processes of intergovernmental negotiation that are dominated 
by the executives of the different governments within the federal system.” From: Ronald L. Watts, 
Executive Federalism: A Comparative Analysis, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Kingston, 
1989, p. 3.
76  jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, pp. 43-44.
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political constitution of the world – an underlying idea that was already present in his 
writings on the post-national constellation.77 The Crisis of the European Union is a book 
divided in two parts: on the one hand, Habermas analyses the EU as an attempt to 
constitutionalise international law, and on the other hand the case of human rights is used 
as an example how to create a legal framework with a global institutional embodiment. 
For reasons of relevance, only the first part shall be discussed here.
The current crisis lays bare there is still a need for a European constitutional project, 
in the eyes of Habermas. A constitutionalisation of international law is not only a step 
towards a future of cosmopolitan rule of law, but at the same time a response to the 
challenges that the EU is facing. Habermas starts off by pointing to a political and legal 
dimension of the constitutional project. First, disembedded capitalism78 has led to an 
imbalance between markets and politics, with increasing social inequality and status 
insecurity as a result. Up until now, the EU has stuck to a bureaucratic way of economic 
governance as a response to the economic crisis. Habermas argues that so-called joint 
decisions on an intergovernmental basis have an insufficient democratic legitimacy 
and do not address the ongoing problem of political fragmentation – while the world 
above all becomes more global and multicultural. Second, law and politics have always 
been coupled, as the former legitimises the latter. Habermas is of the opinion that this 
coupling also needs to be pursued on an international level: in the past the “juridification 
of international relations” has pacified relations and curbed the struggle for dominance 
of power.79 He sees it as the only way forward, and a domain where the EU can play an 
importance role with its project of civilising through unification.
The core of the part on the constitutional project deals with the question whether the 
supranational level of (EU) governance can put the accomplishments in terms of civil 
rights and democratic legitimacy at risk. The uncoupling of politics from the level of 
the nation-state has extended the capabilities of decision-making, yet at the same time 
it has not been supplemented with the equivalent democratic procedures. Habermas 
asks whether the citizens should “pay the price of sinking levels of legitimacy for a form 
of governance founded on intergovernmentality” and he does not believe that a type of 
delegated democracy can offset the damage.80 To find an answer, Habermas retraces the 
roots of state sovereignty and the building blocks of a political community. Subsequently, 
77  Ibid., pp. x-xi.
78  For this idea of disembedded capitalism, Habermas relies on the work of Karl Polanyi. More information: 
jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, pp. 84-85.
79  jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, p. 10.
80  jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, p. 15.
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he highlights two innovations that have rendered the democratic exercise of political 
authority on a supranational level possible.
A first innovation is the so-called primacy of supranational law without state power. In 
the EU “a priority of European law over the law of the member states has become firmly 
established, even though the organs of the Union do not possess such an authority.”81 
In other words, Habermas demonstrates that a supranational political community has 
established itself without the backing of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 
This is clear from the cases before the European Court of justice, which has verified the 
primacy of EU law while also safeguarding some of the principles enshrined in national 
law. For him, this innovation is the main reason why the European continent was able to 
pacify itself after the Second World War.82 The second innovation is related to the sharing 
of power. Habermas explains that the EU has based its legitimacy both on the citizens 
of the Union – who elect members of parliament – and the members of the European 
peoples (represented by the member states). However, these two groups effectively consist 
of the same individuals, although simultaneously represented through two different 
“legitimation tracks”.83 According to Habermas, this has culminated into a conflict of 
interest: what is best for a national people may not necessarily be the preferable option 
from the perspective of a citizen of the Union. Subsequently, he defends a simplification 
that would take EU citizens as the main source of legitimacy. Thus, Habermas hints again 
at his idea of civic solidarity as a fundamental part of popular sovereignty. In practise, 
that implies some of the “democratic deficits” should be addressed, such as fragmented 
electoral law, the asymmetric distribution of legislative functions and the peculiarities 
in the rights of the Council and European Council.84
Even if the EU could gradually resolve its issues of democratic legitimation and establish 
itself as a supreme constitutional authority, nation states would not become redundant. 
Habermas acknowledges that citizens still want them, despite their artificial origins, 
because they are still needed to protect regional distinctiveness. However, equal 
freedoms and constitutional rights is something that should be guaranteed at a higher 
level.85 To reach this “transnational democracy”, as opposed to executive federalism 
and bureaucratic rule, Habermas remarks that political elites should not hesitate any 
longer but rather work on adequate political steering for the economic project – based 
81  Ibid., p. 24.
82  Ibid., pp. 26-28.
83  Ibid., pp. 37.
84  Ibid., pp. 42-43.
85  jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, pp. 41-42.
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on more input legitimacy. For him the only way to successfully achieve a transition 
from negative to positive integration is when citizens are included in the transnational 
political process – stimulated through communication networks that reach beyond the 
borders of the single state.86
In the final part of the discourse on the constitutional project, Habermas returns to the 
idea of a politically constituted world society, as formerly discussed in The Post-National 
Constellation. Here he still sees the European experiment as the possible precursor 
of his anticipated cosmopolitan community, a future prospect which could be based 
on the two innovations highlighted here. With The Crisis of the European Union: A 
Response jurgen Habermas has consolidated his academic work on society, democracy 
and communicative action, through applying his concepts and ideas to the project of 
European unification.
86  Ibid., pp. 44-50.
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Andrew Moravcsik
Across the Atlantic, one of the leading voices in the academic and public debate on Europe 
and the integration process is the Princeton University scholar Andrew Moravcsik. His 
outspoken interest in the European Union and its institutional arrangement may come as 
a surprise, given that the average United States citizen remains rather ambivalent towards 
the prodigious events taking place on the old continent.87 By tradition, commentators 
and scholars in the United States have always shown more interest in the individual 
European nation-states and their long histories, rather than their recent attempts of 
far-reaching sovereignty-sharing. The preference of transatlantic relations based on 
intergovernmental cooperation, visible from the sheer amount of bilateral ties, has 
inhibited a speedy development of regional ties between the United States and the 
European Union. Thus, with the European Union still under-exposed in comparison 
to the traditional nation-states, it is all the more startling that Andrew Moravcsik has 
dedicated his main academic work on the nature of the integration project. His doctoral 
dissertation about the importance of national interests during the negotiation of the 
Single European Act, which eventually was developed into the book The Choice for 
Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, became one of 
the most widely read academic publications on European integration. The historian 
and book reviewer William Hitchcock defined it in 1999 as “an important work” and 
probably “most ambitious interpretation of its subject yet written.”88  Moravcsik delved 
into the historical accounts of European negotiations to understand why exactly a group 
of nation-states decided to surrender part of their sovereignty in order to cooperate more 
closely together. This made him one of the first American scholars to heavily influence 
87  Although there has always been support for European integration, empirical research has concluded 
that U.S. citizens remain wary of a future Europe that would act as one country. More information: 
Timo Behr, US Attitudes towards Europe: A Shift of Paradigms?, Research and European Issues No. 
29, Notre Europe, Paris, 2003, p. 5.
88  William Hitchcock, book review: Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State 
Power from Messina to Maastricht’, in: American Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 5, 1999, p. 1742.
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an almost exclusively ‘European’ debate and also question some of the widely accepted 
notions of integration theory.
This chapter shall commence by tracing the origins of Moravcsik’s enthusiasm for Europe, 
and his initial research that led to the publication of his grand work The Choice for 
Europe. To a large extent, the analysis of Moravcsik’s work on European integration and 
the role of the nation-states will establish an insight in his theoretical framework, known 
as liberal intergovernmentalism in the field of international relations. Subsequently, the 
most prominent and noteworthy ideas of his current writings shall be presented, while 
linking them to Moravcsik’s overarching theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. This 
last part will mainly put his views on recent issues forward, for instance Europe’s status 
as a superpower, the democratic legitimacy of the European Union and the impact of 
the economic crisis.
A European root
Andrew Maitland Moravcsik was born in 1957 and grew up in Eugene, a city with ample 
population in the north-western state of oregon. With the Pacific ocean in the west as 
a natural border of the U.S. state, the daily reality of the inhabitants of oregon has little 
to do with European politics. yet, it is here that Moravcsik spent his early childhood 
and adolescent years. To understand how such a strong connection with Europe could 
develop itself during his studies, the origins of the Moravcsik family have to be retraced. 
The surname and family tree offer one strong indication of a relation with the European 
continent. Moravcsik’s father, working as a professor in physics at the University of 
Eugene, was a Hungarian immigrant from Budapest. Moravcsik’s father kept most of 
his European habits intact, as he “introduced the family to [the] intellectual life, art, 
and opera”, the lasting remnants to his place of birth.89 Moravcsik’s mother had multiple 
origins, the result of Basque, dutch, German, English, and Scottish ancestors. Both his 
parents were accustomed to Europe and its particularities, which in turn influenced 
Moravcsik’s childhood.
His European ancestry can partly explain why Andrew Moravcsik commenced the study 
of physics at Stanford University but eventually decided to switch his major to history. 
A part of the programme included a semester of study in Berlin, which came to be 
the first of many travels to Europe. In subsequent years, when Moravcsik enrolled in a 
master’s programme of international studies and eventually pursued a doctoral degree 
89  Amanda Pearson, Faculty Profile Andrew Moravcsik, Princeton University, Princeton, 2001, p. 10.
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in political science at Harvard, the European continent remained a pressing force in 
his life. He was in Germany on a Fulbright scholarship and for a brief stint he worked 
as a trade negotiator for the U.S. department of Commerce in Brussels. Nevertheless, 
his original doctoral proposal in 1984 had no explicit connection to the European 
integration project. Rather, his academic work was going to emphasise the high-
technology cooperation in Europe. It was a stroke of luck that completely overturned 
his research interest: Moravcsik received a three-week grant to visit the EU institutions 
and discover some of the European member states, a dense tour that would leave him 
deeply impressed by the strength and capacity of the European integration process.90
Shortly after, Moravcsik felt that he had chosen the wrong subject and subsequently wrote 
the first article on European affairs, which was published in the journal International 
Organization. The article highlighted the relaunch of the European integration process, 
which took place in parallel with the negotiations and ratification of the Single 
European Act (SEA). Moravcsik’s curiosity stemmed from two questions: why this 
particular moment to jump-start Europe and why did they succeed in agreeing on a 
reform package? His ulterior objective was to challenge the neofunctionalist idea that 
the SEA resulted from a coalition between the European officials and transnational 
business interest groups. In fact, Moravcsik seized upon the opportunity to defend an 
intergovernmental institutionalist view, which stresses the role of interstate bargaining in 
this type of international cooperation. According to him, domestic politics should not be 
ignored when interpreting the outcome of the negotiation of the latest European treaty.91
In the article “Negotiating the Single European Act”, Andrew Moravcsik presents two 
explanatory frameworks, that have been dominating the regional integration debate 
since its origins, to interpret the proceedings of the SEA negotiations. on the one hand, 
supranational institutionalism amasses all the factors which find themselves above the 
level of the nation-state, such as the EU institutions, business lobby groups and political 
entrepreneurs, who could potentially shape the outcome of a treaty negotiation. This type 
of explanation is closely linked to the neofunctional theory, formulated by Ernst Haas 
and jean Monnet among others, that stresses supranational (autonomous) processes and 
spill-over effects that spur continuing regional integration.92
90  Ibid., pp. 10-11.; Andrew Moravcsik, Short Biography, Princeton University, Princeton, 2013, p. 1.
91  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft 
in the European Community’, in: International organization, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1991, pp. 19-21.
92  Ibid., pp. 21-25.; Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics, pp. 431-432.
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on the other hand, intergovernmental institutionalism places the state power and 
interests at the core of its explanation. Intergovernmental theory foresees that interstate 
bargaining between heads of governments is the strongest influence on international 
negotiations. Moravcsik subsequently defines the three principles that constitute this 
explanatory framework: inter-governmentalism, the lowest common denominator, 
and the limits on the future transfer of sovereignty. It should be noted here that these 
two schools of regional thinking have remained a dominant force within the work of 
Moravcsik. More specific, his research has mainly been about challenging the ruling 
way of thinking of EU enthusiasts – shaped by supranationalism and neofunctionalism 
– through presenting an alternative approach on an intergovernmental basis.93
Thus, it should come as no surprise when Moravcsik concludes in his interpretation of 
the negotiations “does not confirm the importance of international and transnational 
factors.” After a detailed overview of the historical records of the SEA preparations, he 
assesses both supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as explanatory frameworks. 
With regard to the supranational factors, Moravcsik determines that the European 
Parliament had a marginal role in the negotiations, and the importance of various 
business groups should not be overstated – given their small sizes and late development. 
In addition to that, he sees a problem of reversed causality regard to the role of 
Commission President jacques delors and Commissioner Lord Cockfield – author of the 
White Paper – who are considered to be the two most important political supranational 
actors. While the Commission was generally attributed the role of initiator, and main 
contributor to the agreement, Moravcsik asserts that heads of governments themselves 
generally “proposed, negotiated, and approved” the outlines of the main documents, 
“in advance of Commission initiatives”, and he adds to this observation that “delors’ 
actions as Finance Minister of France may have contributed more to the SEA than those 
as president of the Commission.”94
Moravcsik is remarkably more affirmative on the role of intergovernmental factors, 
as determinants of the SEA agreement. With heads of governments or their direct 
representatives leading the actual negotiations, Moravcsik observes a gradual 
convergence of domestic policy preferences – which has rendered a consensus possible. 
This convergence of preferences is mainly explained by the influence of national 
political parties (with their European alliances) and economic functionalism (the 
pressure to liberalise the struggling national economies). Besides that, the principles 
93  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, pp. 25-27.
94  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, p. 45.
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of lowest-common-denominator and protection of sovereignty are, according to the 
author, the essential reason why the reform treaty is rather a limited or minimalist 
agreement. “The SEA negotiations can be interpreted as a process of limiting the scope 
and intensity of reform”, in order to assure acceptance of all negotiating countries.95 
Moravcsik specifies this by stating that significant reform was blocked in areas that were 
not directly linked to the internal market – thus confirming that the insistence of heads 
of government to keep their commitments limited to certain areas eventually prevailed.
Finally, Moravcsik does not give an outright rejection of the neofunctionalist answer to 
European integration. He merits it as an attempt “to fashion a coherent and comprehensive 
theory”, but concludes that the supranationalist argument – of European institutions and 
transnational interest groups playing a decisive role – is heavily overstated. Moravcsik 
declares that, concerning the SEA agreement, intergovernmentalism and inter-state 
bargaining were the crucial factors to renew the spirit of integration. Consequential, 
while the theoretical groundwork in “Negotiating the Single European Act” was devoted 
to just one period of European integration, Moravcsik would promptly expand his 
explanatory model to incorporate other events in the history of European integration. 
This first publication cleared the road for The Choice for Europe.
Liberal intergovernmentalism, state power and The Choice for Europe
despite his new interest in the European Union, Andrew Moravcsik still had an 
unfinished dissertation on high-technology cooperation in Europe. Feeling reluctant 
to spend any more time on it, he made a hasty, albeit life-changing choice. Instead of 
completing the work on his original subject, he decided for himself to write in the period 
on one year a doctoral dissertation dedicated to European integration. In 1992, after 
succeeding to complete the task in just a year, he received his Phd in Political Science 
with the dissertation titled “National Preference Formation and Interstate Bargaining 
in the European Community, 1957-1988”. It was reworked and published six years 
later, in 1998 as The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, and quickly established itself as the new path-breaking book on European 
integration. The question to be addressed here is: what made it stand out from the crowd?
Neofunctionalism had regained strength with the agreement of the Single European 
Act, after almost two decades of stalemate and no progressive development in European 
integration. While original neofunctionalists such as Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg 
95  Ibid., p. 42.
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abandoned in the 1960s and 1970s some of their original positions, and introduced 
new notions as national demands and political leadership to explain the dire state of 
integration – a shift encouraged by criticism from intergovernmentalist scholars – the 
late 1980s saw a new generation taking up the neofunctionalist framework to explain 
the revived dynamism in Europe. Changes in the security environment and the deus ex 
machina role of (supranational) political actors were the main reasons to believe that 
neofunctionalism still had a theoretical value to explain the whole process of European 
integration. just when scholars were rediscovering this grand theory, Andrew Moravcsik 
entered the arena with an ardent attempt to challenge the growing optimism within 
Europe’s academic circles.96
“This book should not be read as an evaluation of – let alone a wholesale rejection 
of – neofunctionalism or any other classical theory” was the principle message that 
Moravcsik included in The Choice for Europe.97 However, the book largely consisted of 
arguments that challenged and refuted many of the ideas proposed by classical grand 
theory. To be fair, Moravcsik did not simply target neofunctionalists but also scrutinised 
the work of all of its critics. Alan Milward, an economic historian, is often recited as 
one of the authors that cleared the ground for the work of Andrew Moravcsik, with 
his largely economic reading of European integration history that contradicted the 
European idealism of neofunctionalist theory. Nevertheless, Moravcsik was one of the 
first authors to criticise Milward, in a 1995 book review of The Rescue of the Nation-
State, for his one-sided causal explanation of economic goals and European integration 
– which had more in common with neofunctionalism than he had wished for:
“Milward’s position comes perilously close to Haas’s belief that a modern 
state must integrate to assure economic benefits to political coalitions of 
its citizens, without Haas’s underlying technocratic presumption about 
economic development as a backbone.”98
According to Moravcsik, Milward’s economic rationality of European integration had 
not taken the full spectrum of domestic goals into account – not just economic but 
also political – that shape the policy stances of national governments in international 
96  Neil Nugent, The Government and Politics, pp. 430-433.; Andrew Moravcsik, book review: Alan S. 
Milward, ‘The European Rescue of the Nation State’, in: journal of Modern History, Vol. 67, No. 1, 
1995, pp. 126-128.
97  Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998, p. 13.
98  Andrew Moravcsik, book review: Alan S. Milward, p. 128.
32
Andrew Moravcsik
negotiations. The analysis of Milward had “a tendency to overlook evidence relevant to 
alternative [non-economic] explanations.”99
With the publication of The Choice for Europe in 1998, it became clear that Andrew 
Moravcsik tried to establish himself as a sole proponent of a new direction in the theoretical 
debate on European integration. Nonetheless, his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism 
was loyal to existing concepts in the theory of international relations and would largely 
bring a continuation of the academic quarrel between grand theories. 
The question addressed in The Choice for Europe is ambitious in its scope, since it devotes 
itself to the five most important negotiations in the history of the European Union (from 
Rome to Maastricht): how can these turning points of European history, where sovereign 
governments decide to coordinate policies and surrender competences, be explained in a 
consistent manner? In fact, Moravcsik intends to present an alternative grand framework 
of international relations, which revises some of the claims made by other theories. The 
theoretical foundation of his book is based on “a rationalist framework of international 
cooperation” which assumes that “states act rationally or instrumentally in pursuit of 
relatively stable and well-ordered interests”.100 Moravcsik’s rationalist framework – as he 
opposes the words theory and model – revives some of the ideas posed in his 1992 article 
but consists here of three clearly separate stages of the negotiation process: national 
preference formation (based on various interests), interstate bargaining (the result 
of state power), and the choice of surrendering sovereignty (the type of international 
institutions).
The rationalist framework rests on a number of assumptions. First of all, state preferences 
are not always fixed and can change over time. Second, states pursue coherent national 
strategies and act as if they speak with a single voice, even though there can be domestic 
competition beforehand. Third, state governments generate before each negotiation a 
set of stable and weighted objectives.101 Along these strict rational lines, Moravcsik aims 
to explain generalise international cooperation between states. 
The first stage for explaining the outcome of this cooperation is dedicated to national 
preferences, which are influenced by the underlying objectives of domestic groups. 
Moravcsik asserts that “Preferences, unlike strategies and policies, are exogenous to a 
specific international political environment.”102 In other words, they are independent of 
99  Ibid., p. 127.
100  Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 18.
101  Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 22-23.
102  Ibid., p. 24.
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any particular negotiation. In addition, preferences are generally shaped by geopolitical 
and economic interests, respectively reflecting threats to national security and 
growing economic interdependence. For instance, domestic concerns over economic 
competitiveness, and the failure to tackle these pressing issues on a national policy level, 
are linked to the decision to cooperate in various core economic domains (agricultural 
and industrial trade liberalisation, removal of regulatory barriers, and exchange rate 
stabilisation). Subsequently, what makes these important decisions in international 
negotiations possible, according to Moravcsik, is how the merge of national preferences 
can result in a balance of common gains and distributional trade-offs, whereby every 
state is better off (Pareto-efficient).103
The second stage concerns itself with interstate bargaining and the fact that bargaining 
outcomes should bring, on the one hand, more efficiency, and on the other hand, 
a better distribution of gains. For Moravcsik, these two bargaining issues are at the 
core of all international negotiations. Efficiency is relatively straightforward, as each 
government generally is favourable towards gains in this domain. distribution of benefits 
is a more sensitive issue, as it is shaped by the relative power of national governments 
and consequently means that a power asymmetry is present in most cases.104 Moravcsik 
emphasises the spectrum of bargaining instruments that some (powerful) governments 
have at their disposal: they can veto, exit or exclude other governments from the 
negotiations, or create linkages between separate issues and offer side-payments to 
others. With low transaction costs, states dispose of the power to push their preferences 
forward.105
Institutional choice, or the question to delegate or pool decision-making power to 
supranational institutions, is the question at stake in the third stage. Moravcsik explains 
that sovereignty is pooled when decision are taken by non-unanimous voting, while 
sovereignty is delegated when supranational actors have to ability to take autonomous 
decisions. due to the rich and complex institutional architecture of the European Union, 
Moravcsik believes that the current state of integration is the result of a deliberate 
design without historical precedent. As for the conditions under which national 
governments decided to pool or delegate sovereignty, the explanatory concept of credible 
commitments is put forward. In short, credible commitments reflect the existence of 
strong concerns of individual governments over compliance of other member-states. To 
103  Ibid., pp. 25-27.
104  This explains why Moravcsik is mainly focusing on German, French, and British behaviour in the 
negotiations.
105  Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 50-54.
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ensure that decisions on substantive cooperation – with joint gains – will not be in any 
way obstructed or logrolled (due to the individual incentive to defect), the delegation 
or pooling of sovereignty can emerge. Credible commitments also imply that national 
governments will carefully limit the scope of competence for supranational institutions, 
to avoid a potential derailment of surrendering sovereignty.106
With this rational framework in mind, Andrew Moravcsik aims to revise the complete 
history of European integration in the remaining chapters of The Choice for Europe. 
By assessing all the negotiations, each time applying the same parameters, the book 
differentiates itself from works that limit themselves to single cases. Moravcsik has 
combined the use of historical records (observations from primary resources) and 
hypothesis testing, which he considers as “a synthesis between historiographical and 
political science methods.”107 despite its ambitious efforts to rewrite the history of 
European integration, The Choice for Europe has been heavily criticised for making 
perhaps too bold statements, based on often selective evidence and a method that 
reduces the complexity of history to a number of variables and rational concepts.108 From 
its publication, it was seen as a divisive book because of its radical and uncompromising 
approach to European integration, in fact, a clever effort to establish a comprehensive 
liberal intergovernmentalist framework (but avoiding the definition of a ‘grand theory’). 
Moravcsik’s assertion that supranational actors and transnational groups had only a 
tiny role to play in past – and perhaps future – negotiations was a quite remarkable 
conclusion that at the same time would come as a blow to pro-Europeans. With the 
lacklustre outcomes of the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, doubts were again rising about 
the revived dynamism of European integration and the prospect of an ever-closer Union. 
Were Andrew Moravcsik and his views eventually proven right?
Post-Choice: Europe’s dilemmas and role in the world
The Choice for Europe sparked a lively debate on the question whether the “EU was designed 
to serve the interests of competing, dynamic national economies in Europe”109, whereby 
Moravcsik engaged himself in the discussion and addressed most of the criticisms posed 
by reviewers and colleagues in the field. Nonetheless, the past fifteen years have also seen 
106  Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, pp. 67-68.
107  Ibid., p. 84.
108  William Hitchcock, book review: Andrew Moravcsik., pp. 1742-1743.; Neill Nugent, The Government 
and Politics, pp. 433-434.
109  William Hitchcock, book review: Andrew Moravcsik., pp. 1742-1743.
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an expansion into new areas of the EU studies field. Moravcsik gradually became more 
involved with the actual state of European integration, instead of limiting himself to the 
historical path. Since the early 2000s, he has devoted himself to the analysis of what takes 
place on the European continent – both as an academic and a public figure – therefore 
making him one of the most heard voices in the American debate about the integration 
process. As a regular opinion writer for Newsweek and a book reviewer of Foreign Affairs, 
he partly shaped the U.S. public perception and understanding of the EU – which perhaps 
can explain why liberal intergovernmentalism always held more ground on the other 
side of the Atlantic.110 In the academic sphere, Moravcsik’s recent publications can be 
taken apart in three broad categories: (1) the constitutional settlement, (2) the democratic 
accountability of the EU institutions, and (3) Europe as a foreign policy player and world 
power. Each of these three categories will be discussed here.
(1) Before the financial and economic crisis, Europe was still largely concerning itself 
with the hapless constitutional project. A debate that excited Euro-enthusiasts, raged 
Euro-sceptics, but at the same time left the majority of the European people unmoved. 
For Andrew Moravcsik the question was not “whether the EU gets a constitution, (…), 
but how European economic performance can be improved in order to produce more 
jobs.”111 He rightly pointed out that the constitutional project from the start struggled to 
create an interested and informed public, since there were more pressing socio-economic 
issues that had to be addressed by European politicians. 
For Moravcsik, the constitutional debate was an unnecessary move, given the stable 
equilibrium the Union had reached. In the book chapter “The European Constitutional 
Settlement” (2007) he argued that any constitutional treaty could only be a consolidation 
of the current state of the EU, rather than substantive attempt of reform or a step in the 
direction of federalism. The reason for this, according to Moravcsik, is threefold. First of 
all, in terms of substance European integration has no longer a functional grand project 
that could significantly change the process of integration. Moravcsik states that actual 
challenges, such as global economic forces, social inequality and neo-liberal policies, 
are not plausible issues to rally all Europeans. In general, there is “no functional case of 
international cooperation” and often national reforms are preferred over EU reforms to 
deal with some of these issues.112 Even in situations where there is a strong motivation 
110  It is interesting to note that the main intergovernmentalist authors (A. Moravcsik, G. Garrett, j.M. 
Grieco, S. Hoffmann) are all either living or working in the United States.
111  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe Will Get It Right’, Newsweek, 25 december 2005. Available at: http://www.
thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2005/12/25/europe-will-get-it-right.html (consulted on: 10.01.2013).
112  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The European Constitutional Settlement’, in: The World Economy, Vol. 31, No. 
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for coordination, Moravcsik believes that intergovernmental cooperation works well 
enough.
Secondly, there is a stable constraint on the competences of the EU, which means that 
the existing structure remains confederal rather than federal. The Union has limited 
legal competences, no tools for coercion and effectively no system to redistribute wealth. 
Moreover, national officials are still responsible for the implementation of the majority 
of the measures. Moravcsik concludes that there is no reason to believe that the EU 
moves towards centralisation. Instead, there is only a tendency to create a pillarised 
structure – given that the constitutional draft treaty did nothing more than “prolonging 
an incremental shift in intra-institutional power”.113 
Third of all, Moravcsik demonstrates through polling results that support for EU 
integration is rather stable and there is no indication of a legitimacy crisis – that would 
require substantial democratic reform. What is more, he understands the current 
situation114 not as a problem of distance between Europe and the people. “[Citizens] do 
not choose to become involved”, and is in the eyes of Moravcsik the sole reason why the 
constitution has been a failure from the start, as it would never make the underlying pro-
federalist dream of Euro-enthusiasts come true.115 For reasons of substance, institutional 
architecture and ideology, Moravcsik is of the opinion that the EU has already grown 
into a stable and mature system that renders discourse of continued integration outdated:
“We learn far more by viewing the EU as the most advanced model for 
international cooperation, a vantage point from which it appears as an 
unambiguous success story, rather than as a nation-state in the making, 
which encourages cycles of overambition and disappointment.”116
(2) In a different context, albeit linked to the issue of a constitutional treaty, Andrew 
Moravcsik took up the specific issue of legitimacy and democratic reform of the EU. 
His 2002 article “In defence of the democratic deficit” offers a counterargument to 
the widely held view that the EU lacks a necessary democratic legitimacy. Moravcsik 
believes this is the result of a debate that limits itself to the abstract discussion of an 
ideal parliamentarian democracy, instead of observing the concrete practises in various 
1, 2008, pp. 28-30.
113  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The European Constitutional Settlement’, p. 37.
114  Note here this reflects the situation before 2007, with no sign yet of an economic and social crisis 
in the EU.
115  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The European Constitutional Settlement’, p. 43.
116  Ibid., p. 47.
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advanced democracies. on the contrary, his analysis based on “reasonable criteria (…)” 
and empirical evidence shows that EU decision-making procedures are in accordance 
with existing conventions of democratic governance.117 Moravcsik discusses the main 
issues in order to defend the EU system; four of them are considered here.
The first point involves the observation that the EU is not above all a superstate. Its 
competences are restricted by the Treaties and the majority of state functions are 
excluded from the EU policy agenda. The Union faces severe fiscal constraints – it 
does not have the ability to tax – therefore it cannot by itself create any policy that 
requires high government spending. The decentralisation of policy implementation, 
“the separation of powers, the multi-level structure of decision-making and a plural 
executive” are other severe constraints. As a result, the EU can only focus itself on 
areas wherefore a broad political consensus exists.118 The second point demonstrates 
that the EU is not an unaccountable technocracy. Moravcsik asserts there is both 
direct accountability (via the European Parliament) and indirect accountability (via 
elected national officials). Moreover, “the rise of courts, public administrations and 
the core executive” reflect a broader trend, which emphasises a technocratic and semi-
autonomous style of governance, and is also prevailing in other advanced economies.119
The third point deals with democratic deliberation and why the EU cannot expand 
participation. Moravcsik rejects the “ideal preference” that greater participation will lead 
to a deeper sense of political community in Europe and generate more support for the 
EU.120 According to Moravcsik, insulated institutions – such as courts and bureaucracies 
– are often more popular than (elected) legislatures. In addition, expanding electoral 
participation will not overcome apathy towards low salient issues – such as trade 
liberalisation and technical regulations. Finally, Moravcsik also notes that various 
referendums, parliamentary elections and conventions have rather contributed to 
unstable politics (cf. the negative referenda on the constitutional treaty) and do not 
suggest there is some sort of common European identity and we-feeling. The fourth 
point refers to the so-called neo-liberal bias of EU policy making. Moravcsik does not 
agree with the idea that policies are targeted against social issues. He states there is 
little evidence that indicates social welfare provision is being constrained and social 
protection is driven downward – due to neo-liberal market liberalisation. Consequently, 
117  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In defence of the ‘democratic deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European 
Union’, in: journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, 2002, p. 605.
118  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In defence of the ‘democratic deficit’, p. 609.
119  Ibid., p. 613.
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Moravcsik sees little reason to condemn the system, as long as they remain consistent 
with existing practises and have a “normative justification.”121
(3) The end of the Cold War era marked a decisive shift in the balance of world powers. 
For some analysts, it was clear that the United States of America had entered a “unipolar 
moment”, with its power unmatched by any other country in the next foreseeable time.122 
Andrew Moravcsik has always stood against this realpolitik view. For him, the success 
of the European Union rather suggested a different power configuration: “the world 
is bipolar, and the other pole is Europe.”123 Even when there have been considerable 
doubts about Europe’s resilience – due to demographic, economic and military factors – 
Moravcsik has kept to a positive tone with regard the continent’s role in the geopolitical 
balance. The 2010 book chapter titled “Europe: Rising Superpower in a Bipolar World” 
sums up most of the views he has previously expressed in his newspaper columns. 
Moravcsik presents five arguments, resting on a multidimensional view of power, in 
favour of Europe’s role in the world.
The first argument is that contemporary warnings for Europe’s decline are only based 
on a traditional realist worldview, which overestimates demographic, economic and 
military power. Instead, Moravcsik asserts that most global influence today rests on 
various forms of civilian power, and in this area the EU has remained dominant (even to 
the United States). “Europe and the EU have gained influence over the past two decades 
and are likely to continue to do so.”124 The second argument assures that Europe is still 
the world’s second military power, accounting for 21 percent of the world’s military 
spending. They have used their regional warfare capability for various conflicts and UN 
peacekeeping operations. Third, Europe is the most important civilian superpower, with 
its “power of attraction” through enlargement, neighbourhood policy, trade relations 
and its support for multilateral ties and international law.125
The fourth argument relies on the observation that Europe’s influence has increased over 
the past two decades. despite slower demographic and economic growth, Europe still 
has a high per capita income, which generates economic and political, as well as cultural 
121  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In defence of the ‘democratic deficit’, p. 622.
122  Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990-1991, p. 23.
123  ‘The Golden Moment: The EU at 50’, Newsweek, 26 March 2007. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.
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124  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe: Rising Superpower in a Bipolar World’, in: Alan Alexandroff and Andrew 
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influence. The continent is also well placed to interact with other governments on the 
basis of reciprocity – a method it has always supported. Moreover, European societal 
norms had a positive effect on long-term reform of countries in its region. Finally, there 
is also a striking transatlantic consensus and Moravcsik sees the US and Europe “more 
closely aligned than during the cold war.”126 The fifth and final argument rejects the notion 
that the EU needs more centralisation in order to become a more effective superpower. 
Instead, Moravcsik moves the idea forward that the intergovernmental approach allows 
working as a decentralised network, which will benefit Europe’s flexibility in a post-cold 
war world and its particular security challenges. In conclusion, the world will remain 
bipolar in the foreseeable future and even the rising powers will not challenge this 
geopolitical balance immediately – but rather create a deepening interdependence and 
more potential for common problem solving.127
Andrew Moravcsik has established in recent times the reputation of going against the grain 
in most of the debates involving the European Union. His liberal intergovernmentalist 
framework often makes him uncompromising in his argumentation, as he has respectively 
defended the EU’s democratic deficit, institutional architecture and role in the world. 
His challenging of ruling beliefs has not just received criticisms but also brought fresh 
insights in the current state of the European Union. Moravcsik’s commentaries on the 
European economic crisis only confirm this impression, which will be presented in the 
final part of the chapter.
Europe in crisis: a natural plateau has been reached?
When the financial and economic crisis crossed the Atlantic and severely affected Europe, 
it laid bare the weaknesses of the architecture of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union. The recession had saddled European governments up with an unsustainable 
amount of debt, which in turn led to wide-spread panic of a potential sovereign debt 
crisis in the Eurozone. As a specialist in European affairs, Andrew Moravcsik was one 
of the best placed academics in the U.S. to assess the severity of the events unfolding 
on the European continent. For Newsweek, he wrote a regular update on the seemingly 
intensifying crisis and potential collapse of the euro-zone. despite the worrying 
commentaries published around the time, Moravcsik was an author that insisted that 
126  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe: Rising Superpower in a Bipolar World’, p. 168.
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any sort of “pessimism was premature” and the successive phases of crisis and restart 
were an inherent part of the history of European integration.128
In the article “In defence of Europe” he mainly preaches for pragmatism, as opposed to 
idealism or pessimism: the crisis will neither bring collapse nor lead to an increasing 
centralisation of power in the EU. Moreover, the European countries shall find “realistic 
ways of working together”, through bail-outs, debt restructuring and national reforms, 
and an approach of cooperation that always paid off in the past. Why is that? Moravcsik 
considers Europe to be the world’s most economically interdependent continent. Thus, it 
is not high ideals that drive them together but rather necessity – influenced by domestic 
economic interests.129
Even at the time when the euro-zone seemed on the brink of collapse, Moravcsik’s 
analysis in Foreign Affairs defended a pragmatic view of the crisis. The first part of 
“Europe after the Crisis” provides an insight in the underlying cause of the European 
crisis, namely disequilibrium within the currency zone – rather than public profligacy. 
Moravcsik asserts that, while the euro-zone was created with the aim of establishing an 
optimal currency area, it never achieved that due to economic divergence in the past 
decade. Countries as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain had accumulated large current 
account deficits, while Germany was pushing for an increase in external competitiveness. 
Wage suppression and reduced public spending had stimulated trade imbalances and 
generated a surplus of capital – used by banks and investors to lend it to southern 
Europe.130
For the optimal currency area to work, and to resolve the crisis, more economic 
convergence is required. Moreover, it is in the interest of all countries to reach a level 
of stability and avoid a collapse. In order to do this, Moravcsik does not believe that the 
answer can only come from harsh reforms and reduced publish spending. The burden of 
austerity must be rebalanced, which requires “a shift in the domestic policies of Germany 
and other surplus countries.”131 However, all of this completely depends on the fact 
whether or not these countries are ready to make tough political decisions. on that 
point, Moravcsik reaches the core of the problem: while economic alignment may be 
128  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In defense of Europe: Now more than ever, it’s not smart to be on the EU’s 
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in the best interest of all European countries, since it would bring mutually beneficial 
cooperation, there is an increasing unwillingness to go further than required. Have the 
EU’s leaders “pushed integration as far as it will go”?132
despite some intensification of European policy in certain areas, there are few new areas 
that have opened up to centralised European policy-making and there is no sign of a 
movement towards the ever-closer Union. In fact, the most important crisis-measures 
(such as the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact) are the result of an 
intergovernmental agreement; they will be established outside of the EU’s institutional 
architecture. Enough reason for Moravcsik to conclude that, for now and the foreseeable 
future, the process of European integration has reached a “natural plateau”, based on a 
“pragmatic division between national policy and supranational policy.”133
With a liberal intergovernmentalist interpretation of the European crisis, Andrew 
Moravcsik has once again decisively oriented the debate in the direction of the state 
governments: what is their part in the current European crisis and how has their 
behaviour influenced the coordinated attempts of finding a resolution? For Moravcsik, 
state interests offer a solid and comprehensive explanation of the historical path of 
European integration, as well and the current state of affairs.
132  Ibid., p. 67.
133  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe After the Crisis’, p. 68.
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Dialogue
A dialogue, in its literary form, should be understood as an informal exchange of 
contrasting philosophical or intellectual attitudes. Although it may somewhat resemble 
the tradition of the philosophical dialogue perfected in Ancient Greece134 – one may 
consider this a tribute to that heritage – the objective here is to expand further on the 
views expressed by the two authors.  In a similar way to the two preceding chapters, the 
key ideas of jürgen Habermas and Andrew Moravcsik shall be analysed. However, they 
will also be provided from a personal critical commentary and a comparative perspective, 
an attempt to put them in a broader societal context. The goal of this intellectual exercise 
is not to create an invented conversation, but rather to find some sense of common 
understanding of the deeper political and philosophical challenges posed to the project 
of a united Europe.
There are six overarching themes that will be discussed here, based on most of the 
overlapping ideas found in the bibliographies of Habermas and Moravcsik. Before 
addressing each of them in more detail, they shall be briefly introduced here:
European integration: past trajectories and future prospects
Perhaps the most important question of all is what exactly drives the process in regional 
integration in Europe. Are we today still feeling the seismic effects of the establishment 
of a single market or are other factors at play? Both authors not only shed a light on the 
past but also depict a future outlook of Europe.
The nation-state: a source of strength or weakness
Europe’s history has largely been defined and described along the lines of its shattered 
nation-states and separate identities. A patchwork of countries is still at the core of the 
EU’s architecture. How important is the nation-state still for Europe and will it sooner 
or later lose its significance?
134  ‘dialogue’, in: Encyclopaedia Britannica online, London, 2013. Available at: http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/161272/dialogue (consulted on: 30.03.2013).
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Democracy in the European Union: a failure?
often seen as the cornerstone of a modern society, democracy is of great matter for 
the European Union. In recent years, the decision-making process of the EU has come 
under pressure due to reasons of alleged opacity and lack of democratic in- and output. 
Are these criticisms without any foundation or can some problems be detected? Both 
Moravcsik and Habermas have a take on the subject of democracy in the EU.
Constitutional identity and patriotism in Europe
After a decade that saw both grand optimism and considerable disappointment, 
connected to the debate on a constitution of Europe, the questions about a constitutional 
identity and a sense of civic patriotism are still warranted. Is there a reason to believe 
in a common purpose for Europe’s citizens or are claims of a shared identity nothing 
more than an exaggeration?
Europe and the crisis
The recent financial and economic crisis has left many Europeans with a couple of 
complex questions: what has exactly gone wrong and how can this precarious situation 
be resolved? Moravcsik as well as Habermas have been actively engaged with these issues 
in the aftermath of the crisis.
New appraisals of European integration theory
With Andrew Moravcsik as the main exponent of liberal intergovernmentalism and 
jürgen Habermas as an unfettered intellectual, two authors are presented here that have 
something to offer to the current state of the debate on European integration theory. 
What can be learnt from their recent analyses of the EU’s affairs?
European integration: past trajectories and future prospects
In their interest for European affairs, Andrew Moravcsik and jürgen Habermas have 
proclaimed a distinctive view on the matter of the causes of the evolution of European 
integration. In a nutshell, Moravcsik relies on a framework of states’ rational choices 
that reflect underlying economic and geopolitical interests. Although a multi-causal 
framework, in practise the driving force the EU reform agenda has always been 
commercial interests: “the immediate substantive benefits of EU policies” in terms of 
trade liberalisation, competitive market position and efficiency.135 Moravcsik has applied 
135  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Constitutional Settlement’, p. 160.
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this general framework to all past decision-making moments, a research project that can 
be characterised as a historical and empirical analysis of the integration history.
In contrast, Habermas views are less elaborated in terms of past integration. While 
there is some notion of the original aims of integration, such as the need to end 
warfare, ensure protection against extremism and minority discrimination, and 
economic reconstruction and welfare, Habermas’ work deals with a more acute process 
of disruptive transformation, that acts a justification of a deepening of the European 
project.136 What can be described as a transnational form of capitalism is by Habermas 
defined as the “perceived threats from globalization”.137 In itself a sort of uni-causal 
driver of European integration, globalization is treated as a broader phenomenon in 
comparison to the general economic expectations, as they are considered in the work of 
Moravcsik. Although globalization has brought economic advantages to Europe, seized 
through the establishment of a highly entangled market, it has put classical achievements 
such as the welfare state and democracy under pressure. The process has introduced 
the logic of the market in Europe, but also requires a harmonisation with a suitable 
political framework. Here, Habermas’ argumentation reflects an encapsulation in the 
neo-Marxist logic, which focuses on the untenable relationship between capitalism and 
democracy.138
A brief remark should be added on globalization. The use of the concept as a uni-causal 
explanation for various issues, such as the pressure on the welfare state and the spur 
towards European integration, has been criticised by a number of scholars. Notably 
john McCormick has questioned Habermas’ “contradictory accounts of globalization”: 
one the one hand, a structural rupture or transformation, on the other hand, a sense of 
continuity within the history of capitalism.139 For McCormick, it is contradictory to give 
two different meanings to the same concept. To be precise, it appears that McCormick has 
some issue with Habermas’ representation of globalization as a resurgent phenomenon 
that cannot be compared with previous eras of increased (economic) interconnectedness. 
What makes this era so unique and why is it so hostile towards the national constellation 
– unlike previous strives for globalisation? While Habermas emphasises some elements, 
such as the global economy and locational competition, there is an element of vagueness 
136  jürgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’, 2001, p. 7.
137  Ibid., p. 9.
138  This is well demonstrated in the work of Wolfgang Streeck: ‘The Crises of democratic Capitalism’, 
in: New Left Review, No. 71, 2011, pp. 5-29.
139  john P. McCormick, ‘Habermas, Supranational democracy and the European Constitution’, in: 
European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2006, pp. 398-399.
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that lingers in his argumentation, unable to explain why current intergovernmental 
efforts of cooperation and multi-level governance are all insufficient. Globalization 
may therefore be seen as a somewhat broad and imprecise framework to comprehend 
some of the mentioned structural changes that have taken place over the last decades. 
Here again, it seems that the underlying tension between capitalism and democracy is 
rather the main concern and Habermas’ underlying argument to reason in favour of 
EU integration.
Although at first sight it may seem there is no strong case for comparison, both 
authors express strong awareness of the economic interdependence between states in 
Europe. Habermas discusses “the growing need for coordination, due to increasing 
interdependence, [that] is met by inter-state agreements” and at the same time Moravcsik 
displays a similar idea, shown in his concise overview of Europe’s history of integration: 
“The interests of European governments consistently converged across a wide range of 
issues in response to a 50-year regional boom in intra-industry trade and investment, 
which made Europe by far the most interdependent region in the world.”140 Alignment 
between the European states is profoundly dependent on the conditions of the global 
economy, a past pattern likely to reproduce itself in the future.
In terms of future pathways of integration, Moravcsik sees no radical altering. As 
demonstrated in the second chapter, his recent writings depict the European Union in a 
state of equilibrium, with a stable balance between supranational and intergovernmental 
policy-making. Moreover, the crisis has exemplified that the evolution of European 
integration has reached a “natural plateau” and the idea of an ever-closer Union is rather 
a fallacy than realistic prospect.141 Moravcsik is certainly thought-provoking when he 
asserts that is not the right analytical question to ask what the end-state of the EU is, 
but rather how a decision of European states to coordinate their policies has developed 
into the most complex international political structure to date.142
This sort of pragmatism cannot be retraced in the work of Habermas, which often reads 
more like a set of recommendations than a detailed scientific analysis. His main arguments 
are formulated in somewhat a disguised fashion, as they are not just isolated observations 
but rooted in his overall intellectual thinking – which is not known by most of the target 
audience. For instance, Habermas’ discourse on the European Union is undoubtedly 
140  jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’, p. 49.; Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Constitutional 
Settlement’, p. 160.
141  Moravcsik, ‘Europe After the Crisis’, p. 68.
142  Moravcsik, ‘The Constitutional Settlement’, p. 47.
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connected to the essays of the 1990s on the post-national constellation. Most of his 
advocacy of European integration has to be interpreted in that light. Habermas identifies 
Europe as the first experiment of creating a transnational democracy, which could serve 
as an example for the future establishment of a cosmopolitan community, often referred 
to as a world political system. In other words, transnational capitalism can only be 
complemented with a framework of public deliberation, which would bring increased 
democratic legitimacy through citizen participation and voting. For Habermas, the only 
viable future for Europe, or the world, is a condition of perpetual peace, originally 
envisioned by the main exponent of Enlightenment thinking Emmanuel Kant, and for 
Habermas achieved through a democratically legitimate global political community.143
With vastly different end-states for the European Union, the question becomes all the 
more intriguing which author holds the most realistic alternative. From an academic 
viewpoint, Moravcsik’s work is clearly supported by extensive evidence – referring to 
the main work The Choice for Europe. However, contemporary commentators have 
also noted that Moravcsik has a tendency to emphasise observations that fit into his 
intergovernmental framework. For instance, Helen Wallace expressed some concern 
over Moravcsik’s strong reliance on “memoirs and witness” of national politicians – 
not drawing similar information from supranational actors – a remark eventually 
acknowledged by Moravcsik.144 Moreover, an excellent empirical analysis of a historical 
process does not always provide certainty about future expectations. Given the fact that 
it is fairly impossible to extrapolate any prediction from a historical and rather a-linear 
evolution, there is no way to foresee the future of European integration and perhaps 
Moravcsik’s statement of a natural plateau may have been too bold a claim to make.
Then again, Habermas’ work offers only a normative vision of what the European Union 
one day could represent. For McCormick, it is “something less than an empirically- 
and historically-informed normative framework for a postnational future”.145 Habermas 
establishes the preconditions of a future supranational political community, where 
democracy and capitalism can be reconciled, which is today no more than an ideal type. 
Thus, should his work only be interpreted in that light or does this also constitute the 
143  jürgen Habermas, ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace’, in: Ciaran Cronin and Pablo deGreiff (eds.), 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000.
144  Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, in: Antje Wiener and 
Thomas diez (eds.), European Integration Theory (2nd edition), oxford University Press, oxford, 2009, 
p. 73.; Helen Wallace, james A. Caporaso, Fritz W. Schampf and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Review section 
symposium: The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht’, in: 
journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1999, p. 158.
145  john P. McCormick, ‘Habermas, Supranational democracy’, p. 422.
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need to consider the building blocks that would make such a political system possible: 
transnational democracy, European-wide public sphere, civil solidarity and a collective 
identity? These are issues that will be addressed in the next themes. For now, the only 
conclusion that can be drawn from Habermas’ writings is that a sense of realism seems 
to be absent, especially when it comes to the creation of a cosmopolitan community.146
The nation-state: a source of strength or weakness
Few concepts are as divisive and inconclusive as the nation-state, though it has dominated 
theoretical thinking from the late 18th century until the present day. There is absolutely 
no consensus on a general definition. For each author, the nation-state encloses 
something different. Where does it come from? For Benedict Anderson, “disagreement 
over its origins is matched by uncertainty about its future.”147 Is the nation-state an 
everlasting phenomenon or set to disappear in the nearby future? often, the debate on 
European integration has led to the question whether the European nation-states are 
slowly evaporating in a new type of political constellation. Answering this is a daunting 
task. Nevertheless, Moravcsik and Habermas offer some orientation in the expanding 
discussion on Europe’s nation-state.
Given the importance of the European nation-states in liberal intergovernmental theory, 
acting as critical actors in the international environment, it is surprising that Andrew 
Moravcsik rarely mentions the word nation-state in his research. While his work deals 
a lot with state power, rational choice and national preferences, reflecting the position 
of national politicians and domestic society, he does not explicitly refer to the debate 
of the nation-state. However, his intergovernmental vision has implications for the 
nation-state, meaning that state sovereignty is kept intact and strengthened through 
EU membership. For Moravcsik, states are still at the core and in charge for what takes 
place at the European level. In other words, there is no indication that a post-national 
constellation is shaping itself, thus threatening the existence of the nation-state. In truth, 
Moravcsik asserts that by strengthening cooperation, the nation-state is reinvigorating 
itself.148
146  As mentioned in the first chapter, Habermas criticised the Frankfurter Schule for its idealistic 
conceptions of society. However, Habermas appears to make the same error when it comes to his 
idea of a world society.
147  Benedict Anderson, ‘Introduction’, in: BALAKRISHNAN, Gopal (ed.), Mapping the Nation, Verso, 
London, 1996, p. 1.
148  Gary Marks, Liesbeth Hooghe and Kermit Blank, ‘European Integration from the 1980s: Static-
Centric v. Multi-level Governance’, in: journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1996, p. 
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If we compare this to Habermas, it is interesting to note there is an implicit opposition 
between the two in how the nation-state’s present role is perceived. The following citation 
discusses the rise and fall of the nation-state:
“The phenomena of the territorial state, the nation, and a popular economy 
constituted within the national borders formed a historical constellation 
in which the democratic process assumed a more or less convincing 
institutional form. And the idea of a democratic society as a whole has, 
until now, been realized only in the context of the nation-states. Today, 
developments summarized under the term “globalization” have put this 
entire constellation into question.”149
To clarify here: perhaps Moravcsik would go along with the idea that globalization 
has shrunk the scope for national policy action, which would explain why domestic 
pressures have led to increased economic cooperation and integration. on that matter, 
the two authors still tend to agree in their analysis. However, the real opposition runs 
a bit deeper. In contrast to Moravcsik, Habermas does not conclude that the challenges 
are alleviated just by cooperating together, with a type of inter-state bargaining based 
on national preferences. In fact, intergovernmental cooperation is an insufficient 
answer to what he defines as globalization, as it does not stop the erosion of the 
greatest accomplishment of the last two centuries: a community based on democratic 
legitimation and social integration.150 only when “the modern republic, participatory 
democracy, and constitutional politics” are extended to the European level – implying 
a closer political union but not necessarily a European nation-state – there is a change 
of success.151 In fact, Habermas gives a predictive view of European integration: the 
traditional nation-state, even engaging in international cooperation, is set to become a 
historical phenomenon, due to its defencelessness against the present day challenges – 
although it remains somewhat unclear what makes these present challenges substantively 
different from the previous threats.
If the abstract discussion of the nation-state is formulated in a precise question, the 
dissenting opinions appear more explicit. What is the future shape of Europe? In his 
rejection of most neo-functionalist claims, Moravcsik has asserted himself as an author 
arguing in favour of the existing international configuration. A European federal state, or 
“superstate”, is highly unlikely as the member states will remain at the core of European’s 
342.; Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, p. 472.
149  own emphasis. jürgen Habermas, The Post-National Constellation, p. 60.
150  jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’, p.284.
151  Benedict Anderson, ‘Introduction’, p. 14-15.
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integration project.152 Habermas, contrary to what is often believed, is not to be taken as 
a federalist. He often gives a blurry picture of his views, referring in different contexts to 
the post-national constellation, the “European nation-state”, a transnational community 
or a “world state”.153 However, in 2012 Habermas wrote that the “constitutional model 
of a federal state is the wrong one for such a transnational democracy”, confirming that 
he is more worried about the democratic configuration of the EU, as a counterbalance 
to capitalism, than Europe’s transformation into a federal state.154 It demonstrates well 
that Habermas means something different with integration and achieving an ever-closer 
Union, from what most of the contemporary writers say: there is a hope for the creation of 
shared political culture, based on a sense of civic solidarity and supported by a legitimate 
democracy, which is not just driven by the markets. Above all, he wants to avoid a 
relapse to nationalist thinking, which would only bring protectionism and exclusion. 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable to observe that he at once rejects the model of a federal 
state to realise his vision of a transnational democracy – which is probably connected to 
his strict interpretation of the EU’s executive federalism as a sort of intergovernmental, 
post-democratic rule.155
An issue such as the nation-state certainly shows there is quite a disparity between 
Habermas and Moravcsik. At the same time, it leaves room for viable questions. For 
instance, what is exactly the balance between the nation-state and the post-national 
constellation? Moravcsik work often reads as an optimistic take on the future of the 
nation-state, while Habermas has expressed pessimism and frequent worries over the 
fate of the nation-state, including its democratic and welfare credentials. Perhaps the 
truth is somewhere in the middle: while the global economy is laying bare the limits 
of what nation-states can do in terms of policy, as to soften the impact of negative 
externalities, the existence of the EU not only indicates a supranational answer but also 
an intergovernmental attempt to cope with a changing world. After all, the nation-state 
is a tenacious phenomenon, and far from worn-out.
152  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In defence of the democratic deficit’, p. 606.
153  jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’, p. 46.; jürgen Habermas, The Post-National 
Constellation, p. 109.
154  jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, p. ix.
155  jürgen Habermas, ‘The European Nation-State’, p. 56.
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Democracy in the European Union: a failure?
The two authors have regularly touched upon democracy, one of the most prevalent 
issues at hand and often employed by Euro-critics to condemn present decision-making 
process of the EU. Andrew Moravcsik never agreed with these condemnations and has 
defended the democratic credentials of the Union. As stated before, he is unconcerned 
by a democratic deficit that is in line with the common practises applied by individual 
member states. “Most critics compare the EU to an ideal plebiscitary or parliamentary 
democracy, standing alone, rather than to the actual functioning of national democracies 
adjusted for its multi-level context.”156 Moreover, the sharing of power and tasks guaranties 
sufficient checks and balances: the representation of national officials as well as direct 
control by the European Parliament can prevent European officials from carrying out 
reforms viewed unfavourably by the national electorates. Also, the EU is largely dealing 
with technical and non-salient issues, which are not considered to be important by the 
majority of the citizens.157
jürgen Habermas has become one of the fiercest opponents of the current decision-
making process, and therefore seen by Moravcsik as one of the “[r]adical critics of the 
democratic deficit” for his proposals of “populist democracy”.158 To summarise the work 
of Habermas again, it includes a strong rejection of the obscure decision-making process 
(referring to the Council and the informal meetings and various committees), and a 
criticism of what is labelled as executive federalism (intergovernmental negotiations 
led by the executive power of all member states). Habermas bemoans the fact that most 
of the elements of transnational democracy in the Lisbon Treaty have been diluted, 
due to the crisis, in favour for a post-democratic, bureaucratic rule. It is “[a] form of 
intergovernmental rule by the European Council, moreover, one which is at odds with 
the spirit of the Treaty. Such a regime (…) would enable them to transfer the imperatives 
of the markets to the national budgets.”159 For Moravcsik, as stated in a short book 
review of The Crisis of the European Union, Habermas proposes “expanding, rather 
than shrinking, genuine democratic control” in order that the EU would permit “its 
member states to better govern their societies in the face of globalization”. And although 
Moravcsik seems to acknowledge that reality, he remains unconvinced by the arguments 
denouncing the decision-making process in the EU.
156  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In defence of the democratic deficit’, p. 621.
157  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Myth of Europe’s “democratic deficit”’, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 43, No. 
6, 2008, p. 340.
158  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Myth of Europe’s “democratic deficit”’
159  jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, p. 52.
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Moravcsik makes a strong argument when saying that the Union is not performing 
worse than most of its member states or other advanced industrial societies. This implies 
that the EU should be held to the same standard as other democratic societies in the 
world. However, the argument that the EU is generally dealing with non-salient and 
technical issues has become rather precarious. Ever since the crisis unfolded, national 
and European officials have closely cooperated together to find a common answer to 
the vast consequences of the economic downturn. For instance, the sovereign debts 
difficulties have resulted in broad measures (bail-out packages, deficit reduction plans 
and stability mechanisms among others) with a huge impact on the national government 
budgets – which in turn imposes additional pressure on the citizens. In addition, the 
majority of these decisions have been taken without any strong involvement of the 
European Parliament, the only directly elected institution. Also, the member-states 
affected by some of these measures, such as the bail-out packages, have little leverage 
over their content and implementation – often leading to great public anger.160
In truth, it is a myth that measures taken at the European level by officials not directly 
elected by the European people are nothing more than low-salient issues. Recent 
decisions on banking regulation and economic governance have demonstrated that these 
issues hold large ramifications for national economies and societies.161 Additionally, 
while Habermas may have been too radical in his conclusions, he rightly voices doubts 
over some of the institutional peculiarities. For example: why does the European 
Parliament not have the same amount of competences as the Council – which would 
effectively make it a bicameral system? Is it acceptable that the role of the European 
Council is not clearly defined, even though it has acquired a lot of clout through political 
decisions and laying down policy guidelines?162 Why are the decisions of the European 
Central Bank kept secret, considering the important powers the institution recently has 
acquired? Habermas’ critiques hold value and have far-reaching implications for the EU’s 
institutional architecture, something that should not be immediately discarded because 
160  joão Carlos Espada connects the spread of political extremisms and the wholesale rejection of the 
European project with a perceived feeling of citizens being closed out from these important decisions: 
“The euro was beyond dispute, demanded balanced budgets, and decisively removed crucial national 
questions (…) from the hands of national parliaments and mainstream parties.” From: joão Carlos 
Espada ‘The Sources of Extremism’, in: journal of democracy, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2012, pp. 15-22.
161  EU economic governance, 16 April 2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
economic_governance/index_en.htm (consulted on: 16.04.2013).
162  The former adviser to EC President Herman Van Rompuy, baron Frans van daele, has described 
the European Council as “the most powerful and political body in the EU” today. Frans van dale, 
The European Council/Le Conseil européen, Compact seminar, College of Europe (Natolin), 18-19 
April 2013.
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of pragmatic reasoning. Moravcsik’s arguments do not always hold true in practise, as 
it has been observed that delegated democracy does not necessarily generate sufficient 
supervision, and policy outputs that reflect public preferences.163 “The impossible 
standard of an idealized conception of Westminsterian or ancient-style democracy” 
should not be envisioned as the end-goal, but commentators should remain vigilant 
in exposing the pitfalls of the EU’s decision-making process and insist on perpetual 
improvements.164
To conclude this theme, the question of deliberative democracy should furthermore 
be considered here. In the past, Habermas has expressed himself often in favour of a 
deliberative model of citizen participation, with Switzerland as a notable example165, 
which in turn could strengthen its democratic credentials of the European Union. The 
concept of deliberative democracy fits well in his overarching view of the public sphere, 
communicative action and the creation of a shared political culture. However, once 
more the question can be raised whether this has immediate relevance to Europe, where 
identification with the national territory, culture and identity is relatively enduring. 
To bring people together in a European sphere of political participation and joint 
deliberation, a sense of collective identity needs to be present – may it be civic, ethnic or 
something else. Is that the case in present-day Europe? Some experiments of deliberative 
democracy have been undertaken (e.g. the G1000-initiative in Belgium), though only 
the national level and with mixed results.166 Perhaps the European Citizen’s Initiative 
can be considered as a first European experiment in deliberative democracy, albeit a 
rudimentary and flawed system of citizen participation. Nevertheless, all of this is far 
away from the deliberative model that Habermas originally envisioned, in 1981, and 
given the current state of affairs it seems that Moravcsik’s view holds truth: “Reform 
to increase direct political participation (...) would almost likely undermine public 
legitimacy, popularity and trust without generating greater public accountability.”167 At 
163  Christopher Lord, Politics and Policies of the European Union, Course lectures, College of Europe 
(Natolin), october 2012.
164  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Myth of Europe’s “democratic deficit”’, p. 332.
165  Roland Benedikter and Lukas Kaelin, ‘The Swiss Miracle? Beyond Chocolate, Cheese, and Banking’, 
in: Foreign Affairs, 9 April 2013. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139142/roland-
benedikter-and-lukas-kaelin/the-swiss-miracle (consulted on: 10.04.2013).
166  Barbara Spinelli, ‘European Union: Politics turns back to the Athens agora’, Presseurop.eu, 25 March 
2013. Available at: http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/3577861-politics-turns-back-
athens-agora (consulted on: 26.03.2013).; In Belgium the G1000-initiative has presented its main 
conclusions although little action has since then been undertaken by politicians to implement the 
set of recommendations from public participants.
167  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Myth of Europe’s “democratic deficit”’, p. 340.
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a time when harsh economic measures are imposed on member states, when citizens are 
rallying against the call for increased austerity, more deliberation would almost certainly 
bring a rejection of the European Union.168 A few small initiatives will not resolve the 
deep running issues of identification and participation.
Constitutional identity and patriotism in Europe
jürgen Habermas has coined the concept of constitutional patriotism to define a 
form of abstract and legal solidarity, reproduced through political participation of the 
citizens. It rejects the notion that a democratic society needs to be rooted in a nation – 
or based on a majority culture – to create a sense of common purpose. Constitutional 
patriotism is Habermas’ core concept, because it connects civic solidarity and political 
participation, with his theories of the public sphere and communicative action. Even 
today, what is the importance of a European constitution? As said before, a constitution 
is Habermas’ preferred method to protect the balance between an abstract legal order 
and the various cultures and traditions within a community. In addition, people have 
rights and a constitution could make Europeans citizens actors in politics again – instead 
of being reduced to spectators while states and governments demand all the attention. 
For Europe, where the idea of civil solidarity has not yet materialised in practise, a 
European constitution (preceded by a European-wide debate) would act as a catalyst 
to bring citizens back in the limelight, create a sense of solidarity – that would develop 
into a shared political culture.169
To reflect briefly on Habermas’ notion of a shared political culture, incorporating a 
public sphere where freedom of speech and communication are highly valued, it is 
not hard to see the resemblance with the conception of an open society, imagined by 
the Austrian-British scholar Karl Popper.170 While the two authors have often been 
considered as opponents, especially in the issue of scientific methodology, they share 
a common understanding of how a democratic society should be organised. Gregory 
Stokes, a political scientist that has examined their work, sees a convergence in Popper’s 
idea of an open society and Habermas’ concept of an ideal speech situation. “Both 
168  joseph Stiglitz, ‘Citizens in Europe are rejecting austerity policies as deeply misguided’, The Guardian, 
6 March 2013. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/economics-blog/2013/mar/06/
citizens-europe-reject-austerity-misguided (consulted on: 06.04.2013).
169  Georg diez, ‘Habermas, the Last European’.; éva Biró-Kaszás, ‘Habermas on European Constitution 
and European Identity’, in: journal of Social Research and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2010, p. 82.
170  Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (7th edition), Routledge, London, 2002.
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philosophers advocate a public sphere characterised by free dialogue and criticism set 
within a democratic context.”171 Popper’s idea of an open society is rooted in a strong 
belief of the rule of law, which includes the protection of human rights, political liberties 
and essential liberties. This is a view similar to Habermas’ abstract legal order, which 
strongly relates to the American Constitution. In turn, once more it exhibits the influence 
of Anglo-Saxon liberal and pragmatic thinkers on Habermas.
Although Andrew Moravcsik’s beliefs are rooted in a similar tradition of liberal and 
pragmatic thinking, and he would probably concur with Popper’s and Habermas’ 
ideas of a free and democratic society, he takes a remarkably different approach to the 
constitutional settlement in Europe. What may have been the case for the young and 
burgeoning American republic is not the same for today’s European Union. “[E]ven if a 
common European ‘identity’ and the full panoply of democratic procedures existed, it 
would be very difficult to induce meaningful citizen participation.”172 Moravcsik sees no 
indication of an expanding European identity and he rejects the idea of a constitutional 
debate acting as catalyst, on grounds of popular indifference and lack of trust. In general, 
Moravcsik remains quiet on the issue whether or not a common identity could realistically 
be established in the future. In a short book review, he renounces Habermas’ proposals to 
“enhance participation and deliberation”, arguing that it is based on “wishful thinking” 
rather than actual observations – without giving further comment.173 For Moravcsik, a 
European constitution can only offer some sort of consolidation of the existing political 
structure, but would not generate a stronger sense of European belonging.
To avoid popular indifference, Habermas has proposed to include more high-salient 
issues in the constitutional debate. For instance, European citizens should also debate 
whether or not social welfare policy can be developed on a transnational level. Moravcsik 
disagrees with this type of proposal, since it is completely unrelated to the actual 
policy discussions taking place at the European level. He believes it is impossible to 
introduce issues as social policy and welfare redistribution, since “they lack a functional 
justification.”174 For Moravcsik, issues that encounter strong opposition on the domestic 
level will not be easier to resolve on the European level. opening a debate on social 
171  Geoffrey Stokes, ‘Popper and Habermas: A Reappraisal’, Philosophy: Problems, Aims and Responsibilities: 
Conference to mark the 10th anniversary of the death of Karl Popper, Warwick, 2004, p. 1.
172  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘In defence of the democratic deficit’, p. 616.
173  Andrew Moravcsik, book review: jürgen Habermas, ‘The Crisis of the European Union: A Response’, 
in: Freogin Affairs, 18 February 2013. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138927/
jurgen-habermas/the-crisis-of-the-european-union-a-response (consulted on: 20.03.2013).
174  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The European Constitutional Settlement’, p. 46.
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welfare, that could lead to a mechanism of financial redistribution, would only meet 
hostility in most of the countries. Here again, there is a clash of visions. While Habermas’ 
ideas seem to originate from a normative vision, an expression of an ideal, Moravcsik 
is mainly emphasising the empirical side of the story, and subsequently proposing 
pragmatic answers to Europe’s challenges.
To sum up, one reflection should be added on the subject of European belonging. just as 
the issue of democracy, the constitutional debate raises the identity question, and more 
specifically whether a constitution can insert the feeling of a common purpose in citizen’s 
minds. As all identities are constructions of historical particularities, individual and 
collective experiences, and even the most adamant identifications have some fabricated 
roots175, is it possible to envision that a European identity can be artificially created, 
for instance using a constitutional debate? As Habermas claims, does a constitutional 
debate have the capacity to establish and shape a common identity? Some authors 
suggest, by referring to recent historical cases, a sense of belonging can be imagined in 
a context other than the nation-state. Robert Kearney proposes the settlement of the 
British-Irish conflict in 1998 as an adequate example, where citizens of Northern Ireland 
started identifying to new constellations, after a long period of violence and nationalist 
struggle. “The irrepressible need for identity and allegiance gradually channelled away 
from the fetish of the nation-state, where history has shown its tenure to be insecure and 
belligerent, to more appropriate levels of regional and federal expression.”176 It may be a 
unique historical example that is difficult to reproduce; however, it also holds a lesson 
for the future of Europe.
Europe and the crisis
one subject that cannot be circumvented in the discussion of recent developments in 
the EU is the impact of the financial and economic crisis on a share of the member 
states. over the last years European citizens have witnessed a stringent debate about the 
consequences of a situation where an unstable single currency and the rising deficits 
could pass into a possible break-up of the euro-zone, and even the EU. Some panic-
stricken responses notwithstanding, most of the discussion has centred on sensible 
175  on this regard, Habermas shares in his latest book that “[n]ations, too, just like all comparable 
referents, are not natural facts, even when they are generally not merely fictions either.” From: jürgen 
Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, p. 47.
176  Richard Kearney, ‘A Postnational Council of Isle? The British-Irish Conflict Reconsidered’, in: Ralf 
Rogowski and Charles Turner (eds.), The shape of the new Europe, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, p. 179.
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responses to the question how to manage the issues endangering the European project. 
As demonstrated before, Andrew Moravcsik and jürgen Habermas have been keen in 
their efforts to steer the broad and often complex debate. The two authors offer their 
own analysis of the events, at the same time displaying an interest in specific issues.
Europe after the Crisis, Moravcsik’s most detailed account of the events, strongly emphasises 
the flawed architecture of the common currency. The narrative revolves around the 
rising economic imbalances between surplus and deficit countries, which force the 
latter group to impose harsh measures in order to regain strength and competitiveness. 
Moravcsik rejects the idea that austerity will reach that goal, at least not without severe 
social punishments. “Policy proposals for budgetary austerity, the micromanagement 
of national budgets, fiscal federalism, bailouts, or large funds to stave of speculators are 
insufficient to solve this problem alone.”177 Moravcsik’s account is generally one that 
reflects the strong economic interdependence of European countries, but incorporates 
an optimist take on the events: he believes the euro and the EU will prevail, although 
not necessarily in the shape most Europhiles have envisioned. Nevertheless, there are 
worries about the acute social aspects of the crisis, since the “political and social costs 
of adjusting to a common currency, meanwhile, have fallen disproportionately on the 
poor and the powerless” while “wealthy citizens, bankers, and the citizens of surplus 
countries” remain relatively immune to the budget-cuts.178
jürgen Habermas strikes a surprisingly identical tone, with regard to the austerity measures 
and the social consequences of the budget cuts all across Europe. A key element of his 
passionate pleas involves a strong criticism of the measures inflicted on member states. “It 
remains unclear how austerity policies imposed from above (…) can be reconciled with 
maintaining a tolerable level of social security in the long run.”179 only when it comes to 
the future outlook, it seems that Habermas is somewhat more pessimistic, in comparison to 
Moravcsik, due to his belief that the crisis may threaten the historical project of European 
integration. Habermas holds an important issue in abeyance, when he implies that the 
current stale-mate paves the way for increasing discontent with the political class, and even 
a complete “disenchantment with politics” in the future.180 This is a step that Moravcsik 
has not taken in his analysis of the crisis. Next, the work of Habermas deals only indirectly 
with the economic side of the events, i.e. the troubles of the common European currency. 
177  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe After the Crisis’, p. 55.
178  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe After the Crisis’, p. 66.
179  jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, p. 5.
180  Ibid., p. 137.
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As made clear before, the greatest challenge for Europe lies in the configuration of the 
democratic decision-making process. While Moravcsik’s crisis-narrative is less concerned 
with that, one passage does somehow reflect a position that is close to the view of Habermas: 
“This problem makes clear that a more balanced eurozone, in which as much is required 
of Germany as of debtor countries, is not just a pragmatic necessity; it is a democratic 
imperative.”181 With regard to the crisis, the two authors show agreement that democracy 
is a key factor in stabilising the situation.
In general, there is little doubt that both Habermas and Moravcsik are genuinely worried 
about the events unfolding in Europe. In their own fashion, they have conducted a sound 
analysis of the flaws in the EU’s architecture which are currently haunting Europe’s political 
leaders. It is critical to note they are on the same page in relation to the social woes, 
threatening citizen’s long-term support for Europe. Moravcsik’s analysis of the failed 
attempt to create an optimal currency area, has been shared by prominent economists, 
such as Paul de Grauwe and Paul Krugman182, although a majority of European politicians 
still sticks to the flawed narrative of excessive public deficits and the need for budgetary 
discipline to rebalance the European economy.183 Moravcsik is in line with a group of 
scholars that insists on exposing the grave impact of a one-sided austerity programme. A 
similar thing can be said about Habermas, although his work stresses more the long-term 
consequence of a fissure between Europe’s citizens and political class: if the EU loses its 
people (some figures show there is an indication), it will no longer matter what decisions 
are taken. A real possibility, with grave effects, that an opinion article of the political 
scientist josé Ignacio Torreblanca in El País accurately articulates:
“In june 2014, in just over a year, Europe’s citizens will be called to the polls. 
If the citizens’ confidence in the EU is not restored by then, we may be in 
for a rather unpleasant surprise. Saving the euro was essential; but the euro 
is a means, not an end. The end is the citizens: a euro without them does 
not make much sense.”184
181  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Europe After the Crisis’, p. 67.
182  Paul de Grauwe, Managing a fragile eurozone, 10 May 2011. Available at: http://www.voxeu.org/
article/managing-fragile-eurozone (consulted: 30.03.2013).; Paul Krugman, Eurozone Problems 
– NYTimes.com, 30 january 2010. Available at: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/
eurozone-problems/ (consulted on: 30.03.2013).
183  jack Ewing, ‘Germany Resists Europe’s Pleas to Spend More’, New York Times, 8 january 2012. Available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/business/global/germany-resists-europes-pleas-to-spend-
more.html (consulted on: 04.04.2013).
184  josé Ignacio Torreblanca, ‘Europe has lost its citizens’, Presseurop.eu, 11 March 2013. Available at: 
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/3522081-europe-has-lost-its-citizens (consulted on: 
11.03.2013).
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New appraisals of European integration theory
Is it an unfair premise to compare the work of a major theoretician of European 
integration with a philosopher that only devoted a part of his time and energy to the 
same subject, thus treating them in the same way? Can the two of them be adequately 
compared? With regard to European integration theory, Habermas remains an enigma 
to unravel: he does not seemingly fit into any of the classical categories of grand theory. 
Moreover, he staunchly avoids to affiliate himself with one all-encompassing approach. 
In contrast, Moravcsik can be considered as the main exponent of a single school of 
grand theory, namely liberal intergovernmentalism. While that could be seen as an 
obstacle, it will be argued here there is sufficient base material to give them a righteous 
comparison. Before doing that, the theoretical background of both authors shall briefly 
be clarified.
Liberal intergovernmentalism has strongly established itself within the field of 
European integration theory, due to the work of Andrew Moravcsik. In the words of 
Frank Schimmelfennig, the author of a book chapter on the theoretical base of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, it is “a theoretical ‘school’ with no ‘disciples’ and a single ‘teacher’: 
Andrew Moravcsik. (…) LI is an application of rationalist institutionalism, a larger 
class of International Relations theories.”185 The theory has quickly acquired the status 
of a workable alternative to the federalist integration logic, because it offers a clear and 
comprehensive picture of European integration. It consists of a transparent multi-causal 
framework, with a limited number of assumptions that explain the state behaviour in 
all of the crucial past negotiations. More interestingly, Moravcsik has applied the same 
way of thinking to recent events and even projects some of the theoretical assumptions 
on the future. Although Moravcsik originally rejected the label of theory in The Choice 
for Europe, his 2009 book chapter co-authored with Schimmelfennig defines liberal 
intergovernmentalism as a “grand theory that seeks to explain the broad evolution of 
regional integration.”186
The main theoretical assumptions of Moravcsik’s framework have already been discussed 
in the previous chapter. yet, its critical reception and the successive debate on European 
integration should also be briefly addressed. Moravcsik’s seemingly counterintuitive 
approach to the subject was at the same time received with praise and scepticism. 
185  Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’ in: Antje Wiener and Thomas diez (eds.), 
European Integration Theory, oxford University Press, oxford, 2004, p. 75.
186  Note here this is a revised version of the 2004 book chapter. Andrew Moravcsik and Frank 
Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, p. 68.
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William Hitchcock was one of the reviewers that lauded the book, adding, however, 
that “Moravcsik sometimes projects his own rational and calculated analysis onto 
the policy makers themselves, who may have cherished subtlety and flexibility over 
consistency.”187 In a 1999 symposium on The Choice for Europe, which indicates the 
importance of its publication, three authors examined the work to assess its strengths and 
weaknesses in explaining European integration. The main criticisms of Helen Wallace, 
james A. Caporaso, Fritz W. Schampf involved the selective use of historical cases, the 
one-sided generalisations, the unclear explanation of how state preferences are formed, 
and the negligence of incremental change over time (by focusing on crucial moments 
in integration history). While Moravcsik seized the opportunity with the symposium 
to address most of the issues, some flaws remain exposed.188 Let me briefly elaborate on 
some of them.
First of all, the grand theory, which explains the complete process of European integration 
with one single model, is bound to be flawed due to its incapacity to incorporate 
alternative explanations. By now, it has been well established that “supranational bodies 
seeking to enhance their autonomy and influence [are having] considerable success” in 
doing so.189 Moravcsik often understates the role of these actors in the decision-making 
process. Secondly, despite the strong emphasis on state power and preference, there is 
little analysis of what the state actually incorporates. Moravcsik treats it as a monolith 
without separating it in individual components.190 If national preferences really matter, 
it is important to explain how they are exactly formed. Third, with a historical account 
that focuses largely on the formal outcome and final stage of key negotiations, liberal 
intergovernmentalist theory ignores a lot of the changes that occur in between these 
decision-making moments, where supranational actors (i.e. Commission strategies and 
ECj decisions) and transnational groups often hold more sway in steering the debate.191 
Finally, the richness of empirical data facilitates the possibility to cherry-pick cases 
that suit the integration theory. Neill Nugent argues that Moravcsik’s “over-focus on 
historic decisions” may be distortional, since they always emphasise the role of national 
governments – in contrast to commonplace and routine decisions.192 This same criticism 
is also voiced by the three reviewers of the symposium.
187  William Hitchcock, book review: Andrew Moravcsik, p. 1743.
188  Helen Wallace, et. al., ‘Review section symposium: The choice for Europe’, pp. 155-179.
189  Neill Nugent, Government and Politics of the European Union, p. 434.
190  Helen Wallace, et. al., ‘Review section symposium: The choice for Europe’, p. 157.
191  Ibid., p. 158.
192  Neill Nugent, Government and Politics of the European Union, p. 433.
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one example illustrates the selection and distortion bias of cases quite well. In his 
breakthrough article on the Single European Act, Andrew Moravcsik largely rejected the 
idea that transnational business groups had any involvement, citing their small scale and 
limited influence.193 However, the non-governmental organisation Corporate Europe 
observatory (CEo) adequately demonstrated in the past that the advocacy group European 
Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) had established privileged links with political decision-
makers and, subsequently, had a significant impact on the content of SEA.194 This example 
mainly shows that caution may be warranted, instead of altogether rejecting an explanation 
if it does not fit in the generalist framework. Moravcsik’s transparent theory of European 
integration has not been able to avoid that pitfall.
However, the theoretical clarity displayed in Moravcsik’s writing is largely absent in the 
work of Habermas, especially regarding European integration theory. It can be argued 
that the work of Habermas displays a market imperative (globalization) that causes spill-
over effects in the form of a more supranational based decision-making process. Is such 
a vision somewhat compatible with the (neo-)functionalist logic (that stresses economic 
tools to achieve the political project of an ever closer union) and should Habermas be 
considered as a neo-functional author? Habermas never fully embraced the end-stage of 
a federal state based on a nation-state model, which is a crucial topic in this grand theory. 
As said before, his view rests on the emergence of a transnational democracy in Europe, 
a civilisational project rather than power centralisation, which shows little common 
features with the federal union of states. Thus, it would be inaccurate to categorise 
Habermas in the same (neo-) functionalist group as jean Monnet or Ernst Haas. What 
are the alternatives? Perhaps there is more overlap with another historical figure that 
promoted European integration, namely Altiero Spinelli. His vision of “democratic 
radicalism” incorporated some of the issues Habermas has brought up, such as the 
constitutional method to enforce the Parliament’s role and at the same time mobilise 
the European public opinion.195 However, here again Spinelli was also largely driven by 
the goal to establish a federal Europe – and acting as one of the main strategic rivals of 
Monnet.
193  Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act’, pp. 45-46.
194  Matthieu Lietaert and Friedrich Moser (dir.), The Brussels Business, Visualatlantics, 2012, min. 85.; 
Bélen Balanya, Ann doherty, olivier Hoedeman, Adam Ma’ant and Erik Wesselius, Europe Inc. 
Regional and Global Restructuring and The Rise of Corporate Power (2nd edition), Pluto Press, London, 
2003.
195  Michael Burgess, ‘Federalism’, in: Antje Wiener and Thomas diez (eds.), European Integration Theory, 
oxford University Press, oxford, 2004, p. 32.
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Some contemporary writers are closer to Habermas, as demonstrated by the following 
example. Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet somewhat shifted the neo-functionalist 
debate in 1990s in a direction that comes closer to Habermas’ framework of European 
integration. Sandholtz and Stone Weet were inspired by new perspectives, i.e. globalisation 
and transactionalism, to adapt their explanatory framework to incorporate recent 
transformations in the EU’s institutional structure. The transnational society became a 
crucial element of the theory, although little was said about the democratic foundation of 
the European Union.196 Here again, there were notable differences in the approach to the 
subject. What seems to place Habermas apart from scholars with similar analyses is the 
underlying normative vision in his work. European integration is not just the object of 
examination but also a subject of idealism and belonging. Here Habermas does not limit 
himself to the logical aspect of integration but includes a whole narrative of civilisation 
– leading back to the work of Kant and the heritage of the Enlightenment. Therefore, the 
literature of integration theory may offer some guidance for understanding Habermas’ 
position, yet it is not sufficient to capture the complete aura of his work.
Understanding the core substance of Habermas’ work possibly requires less of an 
academic analogy. Since his writings on European integration generally read less like 
a theoretical account and more like a collection of visionary documents, there is one 
other immediate reference that comes to mind. In 1923, an Austrian politician published 
a book on the future of the European continent, which had an impact on European 
intellectual milieus and brought about a popular movement. Richard N. Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s magnum opus Pan-Europa recollects the dire situation of Europe after the First 
World War. Threatened by rival economic and political powers, the European states had 
to act together in order to stand a chance against these global forces. It is a vision that 
resembles Habermas’ idea of a globalized world and Europe’s likely loss of importance 
– even though the concept of globalization was unknown to Coudenhove-Kalergi. Even 
more interesting, is the duality in Pan-Europa that a homogeneous economic union 
should be accompanied with a constitution, modelled on the example of the United 
States of America, laying down the basic liberties and rights and also creates a decision-
making structure (a bicameral system including peoples and states).197 The idea of an 
economic entity accompanied by an equally powerful political system can also be 
retrieved in the political essays of Habermas.
196  Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, European Integration and Supranational Governance, oxford 
University Press, oxford, 1998, p. 6.
197  Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1988, pp. 
122-123.
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In 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi already displayed a keen awareness of the contentious role 
of the nation-state on the European continent, a force of chauvinism and international 
rivalries. He was one of the few dissenting voices that envisioned a future where states 
would no longer be defined on the basis of a nation. In the eyes of Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
nation-states were a historical and not necessarily everlasting phenomenon, since one 
could learn and unlearn to be a national. Similar to Habermas, he envisioned a European 
United States that would be impartial and bureaucratic, where nationality is nothing more 
than a private matter – a comparable evolution with religion in Europe. Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s separation of nation and state can be connected to Habermas’ concept of a civic 
nation, where affinity between Europeans is strictly based on a common belief in the rule 
of law and a set of shared (constitutional) principles. The real challenge for both of them, 
however, is how to create common feeling of belonging to an impartial European entity, 
i.e. the creation of a pluralist yet homogenised community. Here again, the question 
remains whether a constitutional debate or a shared public opinion can serve as a catalyst 
to create a sense of a common purpose. Both Coudenhove-Kalergi and Habermas stress 
the importance of transnational communication networks. Also education could shape 
the creation of a European culture, according to Coudenhove-Kalergi.198
What jürgen Habermas ultimately shares with his European compatriot Richard N. 
Coudenhove-Kalergi is an enlightened belief in Europe as a civilisational and modernist 
project, to overcome past woes, including rapturous conflicts and social devastation. 
It can be characterised as a grand vision of a united Europe. There is no doubt that 
this normative and perhaps teleological style of argumentation contradicts with the 
meticulous, rationalist approach of Andrew Moravcsik. Habermas’ essays on the 
European project not only encompass a theoretical framework but also include a strong 
element of persuasion: a message to European citizens to avoid inaction and seize the 
opportunity of demanding a full-fledged democratic decision-making process in the 
EU, a step towards a world society. 
This theoretical assessment of European integration has shown that the divide often 
runs deep between Moravcsik and Habermas. yet it would also be a simplification 
to completely reject any similarities. This is well displayed in the following example, 
that shows both convergence and divergence in the work of the two authors: In their 
theoretical analysis of the current state of affairs in the European Union, Moravcsik and 
Habermas have paid a lot of attention to the changed decision-making process under the 
198  Richard N. Coudenhove- Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 121-133.; joão Carlos Espada, Nucleus Moments in 
Recent European History, Compact seminar, College of Europe (Natolin), 30 january 2013.
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Lisbon Treaty rules, especially reflected in the strong role of the European Council in 
setting the post-crisis reform agenda. This is demonstrated with the following quotation:
“Merkel’s chief adviser for European affairs, Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, 
laid it out for her in the summer of 2011. Everything for which Brussels is 
responsible works just fine, he told her, while areas that fall to member states 
are in disarray. Thus it would be logical to grant Brussels more power. But 
Merkel decided otherwise.”199
What does this exemplary fragment precisely indicate? despite European high politics, 
supranational actors, the grand statements of the European Commission President 
concerning a federation of nation-states or “United States of Europe”, national politicians 
still pull the strings when it comes to a crucial decision, such as the competence-sharing 
between the political levels.200 In other words, Angela Merkel eclipses josé Manuel Barroso 
in the exercise of European political power. Habermas and Moravcsik are exactly on the 
same wavelength when it comes to the theoretical abstraction of this power division. 
What Moravcsik describes as state power or the intergovernmental approach, is defined 
by Habermas as executive federalism. Their identical analysis of the facts, however, is 
often accompanied by an opposing interpretation. For Moravcsik, Merkel’s role solely 
reflects a natural balance in the European political system, while Habermas sees it as 
a sign of an emerging post-democratic order. It is staggering, yet fascinating how two 
authors with an identical analysis can come up with so diverging interpretations. 
A final thought can be added to this. Each grand approach to European integration 
is marked by inherent flaws. There is no single encompassing framework that holds 
all truth, in assessing the evolutionary trajectory of the EU. General theories have a 
natural inclination to one-sided explanations of their examined subject. In discussing 
the six overarching themes of this subject, both positive as negative commentaries 
could be remarked with regard to how Habermas and Moravcsik have analysed the 
European Union. often their resolutions would go in opposite ways, though their 
different interpretations were based on identical issues and cases. on other occasions, 
their analyses were characterised by a surprising overlap, although accompanied by 
personal interpretations. Such contradictions or similarities should be considered as a 
199  own emphasis. jakob Augstein, ‘Stubborn and Egotistical: Europe Is Right to doubt German 
Euro Leadership’, Der Spiegel, 25 March 2013. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/
europe/opinion-german-euro-leadership-stubborn-and-egotistical-a-890848.html (consulted on: 
26.03.2013).
200  joe Weistenthal, ‘The President of the EU Commission just laid out his big vision for a United States 
of Europe’, Business Insider, 27 September 2012. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/jose-
manuel-barroso-lays-out-vision-of-united-states-of-europe-2012-9 (consulted on: 06.04.2013).
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natural result of the academic and public debate, which serves to strengthen our insight 
in the fundamentals of the European Union. These observations induce to continue a 
comparative approach in the research of major European integration thinkers.
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Conclusion
Europe is ever so present in the lives of the citizens of the twenty-seven member states. 
Each day EU legislation and secondary law affects more than 500 million consumers 
and people of the tight-knit continent. At the same time it has never been as openly 
contested as before. Euro-sceptic parties have acquired a solid basis in most of the 
member states, while some of the imposed austerity measures have been staunchly 
opposed by protesters in the debt-ridden countries. Politicians are grappling to find 
durables answers to combat the crisis, economies are struggling to regain competitive 
strength, and the unemployment rate has skyrocketed in recent months. All of this 
has sparked a debate on the following often-recurring question: where are we exactly 
heading with the European experiment? In the three preceding chapters, I have aimed to 
address most of the contemporary challenges and questions of the European integration 
process, guided by the work of two notable scholars and intellectuals.
The background story of jürgen Habermas and Andrew Moravcsik has aided in 
understanding their way of reasoning, as well as their offered interpretations of the EU 
integration process. At an early age, Habermas immersed himself in the world of language, 
which decisively influenced his later work on communicative action and deliberative 
democracy. His belief in a rational model of interaction has shaped the substance of 
concepts as the public sphere, civic identity and constitutional patriotism. A similar 
analysis can be made when considering the life of Moravcsik. His early acquaintance 
with European culture has left its mark on his later interests as an academic researcher. 
Moreover, his affinity with the liberal and international schools of thinking strongly 
influences his actual views on international organisations and state actions.
A dialogue based on their main arguments, covering six themes, has resulted in a range 
of memorable conclusions. They shall be summarised here along three axes. First of all, 
the past and future trajectory of European integration has demonstrated considerable 
opposition in their views. While Habermas speaks of a constitutionalisation of the EU 
and foresees a future where the national constellation is dissolving into a European or 
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even world system, Moravcsik rather presents the idea that the EU has more or less 
consolidated, reaching a natural plateau where both states and supranational actors 
interact. despite these different end goals, both of them formally reject the notion of a 
European federal state or nation-state.
Secondly, the present form of government has been recognised as a hot issue between 
supporters and opponents of the European Union. Is there a democratic deficit? 
Habermas bemoans the fact that the nucleus of a transnational democracy in the EU has 
not developed in a full-fledged structure where citizens can participate and deliberate. 
For him, the democratic deficit is one of the main challenges of the EU that needs to be 
addressed in order not to lose the support of its citizens. In contrast, Moravcsik sees little 
reason to overturn the actual decision-making process: the institutional balance as well 
as direct and indirect elements of representative democracy ensure a well-functioning 
international structure.
Thirdly, citizenship identification with the EU is often heralded as one of the missing 
pieces of a truly successful process of political and economic integration. Habermas 
embraces the notion of a common identity and shared political culture, established 
through a process of transnational communication networks, democratic deliberation 
and constitutionalisation of the Union. A civic identity, disconnected from the nation, 
is his solution to bring the European peoples together. In comparison, Moravcsik asserts 
that a common identity will not establish itself in the foreseeable future. There is no real 
reason to anticipate such an event, since the European nation-states will continue to 
drive and shape the process of European integration.
Through their arguments, the two authors have exposed their underlying vision on 
the European Union. jürgen Habermas largely explains the contemporary situation of 
Europe not as what it is, but what it ought to be. His formation as a rational and neo-
Kantian philosopher has induced this belief in a transformative process of modernity, 
where society is interpreted in the light of civilisational ideal – and the EU falls short in 
living up to the standards. The work of Andrew Moravcsik is also embedded in a rational 
philosophical tradition, but rather stems from a more pragmatic approach. There is 
less of a normative or civilisational component to be retrieved in his work. However, 
his view from across the Atlantic includes a refreshing element of outsider thinking. 
Unlike Habermas and many continental Europeans, Moravcsik does not evaluate the 
EU generally through its defects and shortcomings. Rather, European integration is the 
most advanced experiment of creating an international structure of deliberation and 
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decision-making. He largely observes a high level of accomplishments and keeps an 
optimist spirit for the future.
Are these two visions that somehow can be reconciled? Finding a common basis on 
their work may at first glance seem to be a challenge. yet, the observable fact that both 
Habermas and Habermas are keen to understand the complexity of Europe’s integration, 
demonstrates there is room for common ground. In fact, the two scholars largely ask 
similar questions in areas as democracy, identity, and state integration. Although they 
may not necessarily provide identical answers, the dialogue-component has shown there 
is definitely a case for comparison. Moreover, complete reconciliation may simple not 
be wanted, as contrasting views often offer fresh insights in old subjects. Contrasting 
Moravcsik with Habermas creates room to discuss and think about Europe, which in 
turn inspires citizens, experts and officials of the EU.
Thus, there are few reasons to evaluate one work in the light of the other, in the sense that 
it is troublesome to conclude which vision of Europe holds more truth and relevance. 
Both authors offer valuable lessons that capture some, albeit not all of the complexity of 
the subject at hand. Habermas is rightfully concerned about the possibility that Europe 
loses its citizens in the transformation to a post-national constellations. At the same 
time, Moravcsik has overturned the traditional assumption of an ever closer Union, 
by shifting the balance towards state interests and bargaining power. He sees the merit 
of the actual architecture of the EU, instead of solely interpreting the light of a future 
federal state. Although Habermas’ pessimism might contradict Moravcsik’s optimism, 
it also holds a lesson for the future research. A simple and straightforward answer will 
never suffice to understand the challenges of the European integration process. The 
European Union remains a paradoxical phenomenon, with its consecutive cycles of 
integration and stagnation, the result of a constant competition between multi-level 
actors and institutions.
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